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( i ) 
Summar.v of the Argument 
The central theme of t h i s thesis i s the apparent 
c o n f l i c t betv^een the "aesthetic" argument that realism i s 
not a r t , and the "moral" argument that a r t should t e l l the 
t r u t h . 
I n the f i r s t section some problems of d e f i n i t i o n are 
dealt w i t h , and an attempt i s made to show that the much-
c r i t i c i z e d ideas of r e a l i t y and resemblance implied by the 
common-sense i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of " r e a l i s t i c " , are not as 
inconsistent as i s sometimes suggested. 
The inadequacies of the mimetic theory of art are 
exposed; and the claim that realism i s not a r t i s accepted, 
as long as t h i s i s taken to mean only that realism cannot be 
the defining c r i t e r i o n of a work of a r t . But t h i s i s not 
equivalent to saying that realism i s of no value i n a r t : and 
other reasons f o r i t s importance are suggested. The moral 
argument, although badly-formulated as a r u l e , i s examined 
i n d e t a i l , and shown to be, i n essence, a v a l i d argximent 
f o r realism. Attempts to d i s c r e d i t the arguments f o r realism 
by appealing to the autonomy of a r t are c r i t i c i z e d , and a 
case put forward f o r applying to a r t c r i t e r i a other than 
those which define i t . 
Thus, by emphasizing the v a l i d i t y of other j u s t i f i c a t i o n s 
of realism, I have t r i e d to challenge what seems to be the 
p r e v a i l i n g assumption that realism i n art has been shown 
to be worthless, simply because the mimetic theory of art 
has had to be abandoned. 
(1) 
I n t r o d u c t i o n 
Contemporary aesthetics tends to look upon realism with 
a mixture of disdain and reproach.. Throughout i t s h i s t o r y , 
Western aesthetics has been l e d astray,, or so i t now seems, 
by the theory that a r t i s the i m i t a t i o n of l i f e . But, since 
l e a r n i n g the error of i t s ways, one of the main concerns of 
aesthetics has been to put realism f i r m l y i n i t s place. I t 
i s now almost, a p l a t i t u d e of c r i t i c a l theory, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n the visual, a r t s , that realism i s not a r t . At best, realism 
and art. are um*elat.ed;, at worst, they are incompatible. This 
t h e o r e t i c a l reaction against, realism has been evident at 
least since the end of the l a s t century, and was noted by 
Arthur McDowall, w r i t i n g i n 1918: 
"The place of realism i n aesthetic theory i s as 
dubious at the moment as once i t seemed secure. 
The aestheticians, who w i l l barely grant a. 
foothold t o the element of representation i n 
ar t are n a t u r a l l y s t i l l , more merciless, to 
realism." (1) 
And the reaction s t i l l continues, Damian Grant, ends the 
Conclusion, to his book Realism (1970) with these words: 
"One i s l e f t ; w i t h a paradoxical s i t u a t i o n . The 
theory of realism has been, discredited, and 
Robert Scholes writes of those who 'continue to 
wr i t e f r a n t i c a l l y * i n the r e a l i s t - n a t u r a l i s t 
t r a d i t i o n as 'headless, chickens unaware of the 
decapitating axe' (The Fabulators p.21) The 
word has been variously re-defined by a new 
(1.) Realism; A Study i n Art and Thought p. 29 
(2) 
t h e o r e t i c a l i n i t i a t i v e which sees i t as 
representing 'the sine qua non of l i t e r a r y 
significance'. But i t i s s t i l l the old d e f i n i t i o n 
that, governs the word i n popular use (on the 
jackets of novels and i n the weekly journals) 
unperturbed by the collapse of the t h e o r e t i c a l 
understructure. Perhaps t h i s i s not, a f t e r a l l , 
a paradox, but a witness to the inevitable gap 
betwe^ the best that i s known and thought and 
what i s generally accepted." (1.) 
Thus Grant (and he i s not alone i n t h i s ) attempts to dismiss 
any concern', w i t h realism, unless, that word, i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
re-defined, as a r e l i c j o f the days before the inconsistencies 
i n the mimetic theory of a r t were exposed; a re s u l t of out-
moded popular assumptions f a i l i n g to keep pace with the 
conclusions of philosophy and c r i t i c i s m . 
But I t h i n k that there i s a. genuine paradox here, and a 
paradox which occurs i n a more acute form than Grant implies. 
As he; remarks, there i s a spontaneous tendency to i n t e r p r e t 
and respond to realism: i n a way which seems to disregard 
what he c a l l s "the collapse of the t h e o r e t i c a l understructure" 
Realism! i s used unquestioningly as a simple descriptive 
category and as a, c r i t e r i o n of value, both i n casual, 
conversation and on the jackets of novels ( as on the cover 
of the Penguin e d i t i o n of Stan. Barstow's A. Kind of Loving, 
where the book i s described as having " a realism and honesty 
that. put... ( i t ) i n a class of i t s own). But, i n addition, as 
the juxtapositiom of "realism" and "honesty" i n t h i s 
quotation shows, the i n s t i n c t i v e appreciation of realism i s 
backed up by a very d i f f e r e n t kind of t h e o r e t i c a l 
(l.> Realism. po24 
(3) 
understructure of i t s own, i n the form, of an appeal to a 
moral p r i n c i p l e . Realism in. art. can be, and i n the nineteenth-
century frequently was, considered i n the same l i g h t , as t e l l i n g 
the t r u t h i n other spheres. This a t t i t u d e i s expressed, 
albeit, rather t,oo dogmatically, by Theodore Dreiser: 
"The sum; and substance o f l i t e r a r y as well as 
social, morality may be expressed i n three words 
- t e l l the truth.." (1.) 
What we have here i s something more than, a simple 
discrepancy between casual, assumptions and c r i t i c a l theory. 
There i s such a discrepancy, and, even i n i t s e l f , i t would 
be worthy of a t t e n t i o n , f o r the f i e l d of aesthetic 
appreciation i s one i n which the label, "expert" i s no 
guarantee of i n f a l l i b i l i t y . But there i s , i n addition to t h i s , 
a. c o n f l i c t between the conclusions of two very d i f f e r e n t , and 
yet. apparently plausible, l i n e s of argument about the subject. 
On. the one hand,,it. i s concluded, from certain well-established 
asstmptions about the nature of a r t , that a r t i s not a copy 
of l i f e , and t h a t , therefore ,realism i s not a r t . This can be 
calLed the aesthetic argument. On the other hand, the moral 
p r i n c i p l e of t r u t h - t e l l i n g can be applied to a r t i n such a 
way that; realismi seems to be an important moral requirement 
of a r t . This i s the moral argument.. I t i s not enough just to 
dismiss one h a l f of the paradox as an example of an aesthetic, 
" n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y " , although I would not deny that, there 
i s such a f a l l a c y . The assumption that a r t i s , or ought to be, 
simply the i m i t a t i o n of l i f e , does seem tO' be a misguided 
(1) 'True Art Speaks P l a i n l y ' i n Documents of Modern 
L i t e r a r y Realism^ (ed. G. Becker) p.155 
(4) 
one,, and leads to inadequate c r i t i c i s m . But the exposure of 
t h i s f a l l a c y i s not equivalent to the d i s c r e d i t i n g of realism 
i t s e l f , but only of one argument i n i t s favour. A d i s t i n c t i o n 
ought t o be drawn, but seldom i s , between the value of realism 
and the v a l i d i t y of the mimetic theory of a r t . That there 
might be considerations i n favour of realism which are 
independent of the theory that a r t i s the i m i t a t i o n of l i f e , 
i s a p o s s i b i l i t y which i s , at present, too often, overlooked. 
I t would be rash to venture very f a r i n t o a discussion, 
of realism without making some attempt to define that term. 
This i s made doubly necessary here because of the suspicion 
that the paradox which has been outlined i s perhaps not a. 
genuine paradox at a l l : that what i s meant by "realism" i n 
one argument i s not what i s meant by "realism" i n the other. 
Such an objection i s i n i t i a l l y quite a plausible one. For 
aesthetic objections to realism are found predominantly i n 
the work of w r i t e r s whose primary concern l i e s w i t h the 
v i s u a l a r t s . The defence of realism on moral grounds, 
however, nearly always seems to r e f e r to l i t e r a t u r e . Closely 
r e l a t e d t o t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s the fact that a. r e a l i s t i c 
technique, tending towards illusionism', i s less highly-
regarded than realism of subject-matter. Discussions and 
arguments about realism tend to polarise around the concepts 
of " i m i t a t i o n " and "truth",. The i m i t a t i o n of r e a l i t y i s 
t r i v i a l and i n a r t i s t i c ; but t r u t h t o r e a l i t y can be an 
important, c r i t e r i o n of good a r t . 
This i n no way solves the fundamental problem. The fact 
that realism; i s valued i n one art form and s l i g h t e d in. 
(5) 
another; respected under one description and despised under 
another, does not make the two attitudes compatible. We 
ought not, indeed, to assume that c r i t e r i a must be equally 
applicable to a l l a r t forms, but we can demand reasons why 
they, should not be. Nor does the suggested d i s t i n c t i o n 
between i m i t a t i o n and t r u t h help to provide us with such a 
reason. For although i t i s , i n general, legitimate to 
di s t i n g u i s h between t r u t h and i m i t a t i o n , and to do so would 
c e r t a i n l y o f f e r an easy way out of the d i f f i c u l t y , such a 
d i s t i n c t i o n i s not necessary i n the context of representation, 
and i s probably i m j u s t i f i e d . For both " t r u t h " and " i m i t a t i o n " 
can be appropriately applied to a representation which i s 
" l i k e r e a l i t y " and t h i s i s the f\indamental meaning of 
realism. When an advocate of realism t a l k s about t r u t h i n 
representation, he i s t a l k i n g about a representation which 
i s l i k e r e a l i t y . When an opponent of realism i s t a l k i n g 
about i m i t a t i o n , he, too, i s t a l k i n g about representations 
which are l i k e r e a l i t y . I t i s because a work of ar t can be 
l i k e r e a l i t y i n some respects and not i n others that an 
attempt can be made to disti n g u i s h t r u t h from i m i t a t i o n . 
But the d i s t i n c t i o n thus drawn, is/.usually a very a r b i t r a r y 
one, which does not solve the problem of our inconsistent 
a t t i t u d e s towards realism, but merely masks t h e i r 
inconsistency by applying ..them to d i f f e r e n t aspects of the 
work i n question. We are s t i l l l e f t w i t h what seem to be 
contradictory answers to the question: to what extent 
should a r t be l i k e l i f e ? And i t i s wi t h regard to t h i s 
general question that the paradox and the controversy about 
realism arise. 
(6) 
To define realism as " l i k e r e a l i t y " i s generally 
regarded as extremely unsatisfactory, and the problem of 
d e f i n i t i o n normally centres around the attempt to give some 
s i g n i f i c a n t content to that admittedly vague and unhelpful 
notion, f o r the sake of aesthetic c r i t i c i s m and teminology. 
But d e f i n i t i o n s which do t h i s , necessary and useful though 
they are i n t h e i r context,evade, by the actual process of 
d e l i m i t i n g an area t o which"realism" can reasonably apply, 
the fundamental problem which realism i n i t s general sense 
poses f o r aesthetics. For the area so delimited tends to be 
one i n which, the c o n f l i c t between moral and aesthetic 
considerations need not arise. The three d e f i n i t i o n s of 
realism which follow show t h i s very c l e a r l y . 
One l i n e of approach, exemplified most emphatically 
today i n So c i a l i s t Realism, i s to take " r e a l i t y " as meaning, 
not simply what e x i s t s , but what i s of ultimate significance 
i n e x i s t i n g r e a l i t y - a normative use of " r e a l " which i s 
not imcommon. Thus the emphasis and selection of the 
s i g n i f i c a n t becomes the major characteristic of realism i n 
t h i s sense, a sense i n which i t can r e t a i n i t s associations 
of t r u t h while no longer being open to attack on the grounds 
of being a. l i t e r a l copy. This i s to be seen, f o r example, i n 
Brecht's d e f i n i t i o n of realism: 
"Realist means laying bare society's causal 
network/showing up the dominant viewpoint as the 
viewpoint of the dominators/writing from the 
standpoint of the class which has prepared the 
broadest solutions f o r the most pressing problems 
a f f l i c t i n g human society/emphasizing the dynamics 
(7): 
of development/concrete and so as to encourage 
abstraction." (1) 
Damian. Grant suggests an al t e r n a t i v e way i n which 
realism can. be defined so. as to be distinguishable from 
i m i t a t i o n w h i l s t s t i l l having connotations of t r u t h . By-
s u b s t i t u t i n g a "coherence" f o r a "correspondence" theory of 
t r u t h i n a r t , he can claim, that the r e a l i s t i c representation, 
i s not necessarily one which f a i t h f u l l y depicts the e x i s t i n g 
world, but rather one which creates a consistent and convincing 
world of i t s own: 
"The meaning of realism has become generalized to 
include the achievement of r e a l i t y , the creation 
of b e l i e f , however t h i s may be arrived a t . " (2) 
A. t h i r d method, neutral between d e f i n i t i o n s of realism 
as t r u t h or i m i t a t i o n , i s that adopted by'VWellek, who, aware 
of the d i f f i c u l t i e s inherent i n . the subject, i s content, f o r 
some purposes, to define realism i n terms of t h e ^ h i s t o r i c a l 
movement of that name, and to c a l l " r e a l i s t i c " works which 
embody the t y p i c a l characteristics of that movement: 
" I s h a l l be content w i t h r a i s i n g the question of 
realism i n the nineteenth century, anchored i n 
a p a r t i c u l a r moment of h i s t o r y , referable to a 
well-known, body of t e x t s . . . I s h a l l make some 
common-sense d i s t i n c t i o n s and lead slowly to a 
concrete description of the period-concept of 
realism, which I s h a l l regard as a regulative 
(1) lhe Popular and the Realistic'zBrecht on Theatre p.109 
(2) Realism.p. 72 
(8) 
concept., a system, of norms dominating a specific 
time, whose r i s e and eventual decline i t would 
be possible to trace and which we can set 
c l e a r l y apart from the norms of the periods that 
precede and follow i t . " (l.) 
D e f i n i t i o n s of these and other less important kinds are 
le g i t i m a t e and valuable i n that they serve the purpose of 
the w r i t e r i n the context of his argument; and t h i s i s a 
p e r f e c t l y adequate j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a d e f i n i t i o n of a word 
as vague and ambiguous-aas, realism. Both Brecht and Grant are, 
i n d i f f e r e n t ways, t r y i n g to formulate a new and acceptable 
c r i t i c a l theory of realism which i s free from the paradoxes 
and contradictions of the t r a d i t i o n a l theory. Wellek i s t r y i n g 
to establish an unambiguous and manageable terminology as a 
basis f o r c r i t i c i s m . But the very consistency and pract i c -
a b i l i t y of such d e f i n i t i o n s makes them unsuitable f o r the 
present purpose. They are so formulated as to evade the 
c o n f l i c t between our ideas about t r u t h and i m i t a t i o n , 
which arises from the less sophisticated, and more 
fundamental general concept of realism as meaning simply 
" l i k e r e a l i t y " . I t i s w i t h the paradoxes a r i s i n g out of t h i s 
c o n f l i c t that we are here concerned; and that d e f i n i t i o n 
which i s least s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r most p r a c t i c a l purposes, i s 
here the most appropriate. I t i s anything but a perfect 
d e f i n i t i o n of realism, but i t raises the problems which 
most other d e f i n i t i o n s have been c a r e f u l l y formulated to 
avoid, but which they have not solved. 
The problem w i t h which we are l e f t i s tfeat which. 
Harold Osborne describes, although perhaps i n language 
(1) 'The Concept of Realism i n L i t e r a r y Scholarship' 
Neophilologus 1961 
(9) 
which i s more appropriate to the v i s u a l arts,as: 
" i n what sense a work of a r t can, and to what 
extent i t should, be an exact r e p l i c a of rea l 
or possible a c t u a l i t y . " ( l ) 
I f "reproduction" or "representation" were substituted f o r 
" r e p l i c a " here, the appl i c a t i o n of the same question to 
l i t e r a t u r e would become more apparent. 
(1). Aesthetics and Criticism, p.69 
(10 > 
Chapter 1: Reality and Resemblance 
The idea of a work of a r t being " l i k e r e a l i t y " i s not 
one which appears p a r t i c u l a r l y problematic to u n r e f l e c t i n g 
common sense. I t seems, at f i r s t s i g ht, to be a f a i r l y 
straightforward matter to apply r e a l i s t i c c r i t e r i a to a r t . 
But when r e f l e c t i o n sets i n , as i t i s bound to do sooner or 
l a t e r w i t h words l i k e " r e a l i t y " and "realism", the i n i t i a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of " l i k e r e a l i t y " begins to look naive, 
a r b i t r a r y and even inconsistent.. The very notion of r e a l i t y 
i s vague and ambiguous. There seem to be no c r i t e r i a f o r 
deciding which objects or aspects of experience deserve to 
be c a l l e d " r e a l i t y " . A case could be put forward f o r including 
or excluding anything. Neither i s the relation: of likeness 
any more straightforward. Can a work of a r t be s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
" l i k e " r e a l i t y at a l l ? And even i f i t can, i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
t o explain why we f e e l that the concept of realism applies 
more appropriately to those art forms which are called 
representational than to others. Eventually the whole idea 
of t a l k i n g about a work of a r t being r e a l i s t i c begins to 
look misguided and inadequate. 
Thus those who advocate, and even those who merely t a l k 
about, realism, are accused of working with a concept which 
i s e i t h e r useless, because i t can apply to anything and any 
attempt to l i m i t i t must be a r b i t r a r y ; or impossible, 
because i t i s a mistake to t a l k about a resemblance between 
a representation and what i t represents. 
A discussion of the value of realism, i n a general 
sense, would be pointless i f the whole concept were 
(11) 
inadequate. But i n spite of the complexity of the problems 
involved, i t i s s t i l l possible f o r the common-sense notion 
of realism to emerge r e l a t i v e l y unscathed. 
I . R eality 
To reformulate the d e f i n i t i o n of r e a l i s t i c as " l i k e a 
r e a l x" rather than just " l i k e r e a l i t y " helps to c l a r i f y 
both the meaning of realism and that of the related concept 
of representation. The advantages of t h i s apparently 
t a u t o l o g i c a l reformulation l i e i n the fact that i t s more 
sp e c i f i c l o g i c a l and grammatical structure c l a r i f i e s and 
s i m p l i f i e s discussion by providing a method of distinguishing 
between primary and secondary uses of " r e a l i s t i c " , thus 
reducing the area to be dealt ..with, and showing that the 
ordinary i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of realism need not be regarded 
ei t h e r as a r b i t r a r y or as inconsistent. 
To t a l k about "a r e a l x" rather than just " r e a l i t y " 
helps t o elucidate the function of " r e a l " here. "Real" refers 
to the status of an object or event r e l a t i v e to the non-real, 
i m i t a t i o n , or pseudo-object or event which i s what a 
representation can best be considered as being. This i s i n 
l i n e w i t h Charlton's characterization of representation as 
a kind of a l t e r n a t i v e to r e a l existence: 
" I am suggesting that words l i k e 'representation', 
'represented' play the same iaort of role i n our 
speech as words l i k e ' r e a l i t y ' , * r e a l ' . Thus the 
expression ' i n a picture' fiinctions l i k e the 
expression, ' i n r e a l l i f e ' . We can say that a 
horse i s grazing i n a f i e l d i n a p i c t u r e , as we 
(12) 
can say that a horse i s grazing i n a f i e l d i n 
re a l l i f e . I n the one case the horse i s 
represented as grazing; i n the other i t r e a l l y 
i s grazing." ( l ) 
This analysis of Charlton's seems to make clear one of the 
most important characteristics of representation: that i t i s 
not so much a statement about, or a description of, something 
as a non-real something. That something can be described as 
"an X, but not a re a l x" means that i t s a t i s f i e s , i n relevant 
respects, the concept of an "x", but i n a non-real context. 
The emphasis here i s not on the adjective " r e a l " so much as 
on the noun to which i t applies; and t h i s has s i g n i f i c a n t 
implications w i t h regard to the analysis of realism. A 
representation of a duck i s a non-real duck. And to say that 
such a representation i s r e a l i s t i c i s to say that i t i s 
l i k e a r e a l duck. "Real" here c l e a r l y does not refer to some 
sort of Transcendental Essence of Duck, or the Ultimate 
Reality of Duckness, or anything of the kind. I t i s not so 
much " r e a l " as "duck" which determines the concept with which 
we are v/orking - that of the ordinary phenomenal duck, which 
swims, f l i e s , i s shot, eaten, and described i n orni t h o l o g i c a l 
textbooks. I t i s important to recognize that the common-
sense notion of "duck" does answer best to the description 
of " r e a l duck" i n t h i s coMext, where what i s i n question 
i s the opposition between the rea l and the i m i t a t i o n / 
imaginary/pseudo-duck; rather than what the re a l duck 
" r e a l l y " i s , whether mass of atoms,, Platonic Form, or 
(l)Aesthetics p.59 
(13) 
whatever.. Thus we are not wrong to suspect highly unorthodox 
renderings which purport t o show us the " r e a l " duck, and to 
doubt assertions that there can be no such t h i n g as realism; 
because we have no way of knowing what the real duck i s . 
II.Resemblance 
The reformulation also helps to solve some of the 
problems raised by the notion of "likeness" or resemblance. 
The only t h i n g which can be appropriately said to be " l i k e " 
a. r e a l x i n t h i s context, i s a non-real x. This provides a 
reason f o r l i m i t i n g the application of " r e a l i s t i c " to 
representations, and f o r excluding other types of r e l a t i o n 
which can hold between a work of art and r e a l i t y . The two 
most important of these re l a t i o n s are those of expression 
and t r u t h , which are sometimes, a l b e i t rather t e n t a t i v e l y , 
put forward as r e a l i s t i c . 
Why should we not say that a piece of music i s a 
r e a l i s t i c expression, of g r i e f , or of storminess? Or that a 
fa c t o r y r e a l i s t i c a l l y expresses i t s function, or a piece of 
pottery the clay from which i t was made? The emphasis on 
the concept of the noim, i n the reformulation, helps to 
explain why not. To merit the description of " r e a l i s t i c " , 
the work of a r t must s a t i s f y that concept; which i n the case 
of expression i t does not necessarily do. Expressive 
r e l a t i o n s do indeed depend upon some correspondences between 
the work of a r t and what i t expresses, but these are not 
the relevant correspondences f o r describing the work as "an 
X but not a r e a l x". The piece of music i s not a non-real 
storm, nor non-real g r i e f ; nor i s i t a non-real expression 
(14) 
of g r i e f . The factory i s i n no sense an unreal factory; nor 
i s the piece of pottery made from unreal clay. The 
s i m i l a r i t i e s which occur here between the work of art and 
the properties or emotions i t expresses are not those 
s i m i l a r i t i e s "between the unreal and the real which merit 
the description of " r e a l i s t i c " . 
I t i s also, I believe, a mistake to assimilate a l l 
t r u t h - r e l a t i o n s i n ar t to realism. I f a d i s t i n c t i o n between 
statements and representations i s accepted ( and t h i s i s i n 
some ways a controversial d i s t i n c t i o n , which w i l l need to be 
J u s t i f i e d l a t e r ) then there w i l l be a corresponding difference 
between the representation vfhich i s l i k e the real thing, and 
a true statement about i t . A description or statement, again, 
i s not the sort of t h i n g of which i t can be said " t h i s i s 
an X, but not a r e a l x". A work of ar t can function as: a 
sort of proposition about the world, making true or false 
statements about i t . But when considered i n t h i s way, f o r 
example as allegory, i t s relationship to r e a l i t y i s symbolic 
rather than representational.Most of the characters i n The 
Faerie Queene, f o r instance, are not very much l i k e real 
people; but then again, t h i s does not seem to matter, since 
we r e a l i s e that they are functioning p r i m a r i l y as symbols 
of vices or v i r t u e s , and relate to other symbols i n order 
to say something about the world. But the relationship has 
now become one of t r u t h rather than realism. For the symbol 
functions as part of a statement (admittedly a statement of 
a peculiar kind) and not as a non-real person, or even as a 
non-real vice or v i r t u e . Many works of l i t e r a t u r e , and some 
(15) 
paintings, combine representation and symbolism i n various 
degrees, and can be considered from either, or, preferably, 
both, points of view. But the ways i n which representations 
and symbols r e l a t e to r e a l i t y are d i f f e r e n t . I t seems odd 
to t a l k about The Faerie Queene as r e a l i s t i c or u n r e a l i s t i c ; 
and yet one would want to say of such a work that i t can be, 
i n some sensejtrue, i n spite of i t s lack of realism. I t i s 
sometimes assumed, and not only by those who deny the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between representation and statement, that what 
i s true i s r e a l i s t i c . But when we reformulate " r e a l i s t i c " as 
" l i k e a r e a l " , we can see t h a t , although realism may be 
considered as a unique type of t r u t h r e l a t i o n , not a l l true 
statements about l i f e i n art may be appropriately labelled 
" r e a l i s t i c " . 
This reduces the scope of " r e a l i s t i c " to the 
representational a r t s : but, although the standard of realism 
can be applied to any representation, i t would s i m p l i f y the 
question of i t s value i f we could l i m i t the discussion, f o r 
the present purpose, s t i l l f u r t h e r . I n doing so, however, we 
must be careful not to ignore the very d i f f e r e n t applications 
and associations of realism i n d i f f e r e n t a r t i s t i c contexts. 
I t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important to include both painting and 
l i t e r a t u r e i n the discussion of realism, because, as was 
seen e a r l i e r , d i f f e r e n t concepts and assumptions tend to 
polarize arotmd these d i f f e r e n t a r t forms; whilst the 
general problem of the v a l i d i t y of a r t being l i k e r e a l i t y , 
remains ess e n t i a l l y the same. Painting and l i t e r a t u r e (of the 
narrative and dramatic kinds) are, although not 
(16) 
i n t r i n s i c a l l y more important than other forms of a r t , the 
two forms that come to the fore i n the study of realism. 
They represent the two poles around which the d i f f e r e n t 
concepts tend to group themselves, and they are also the 
forms which have figured most prominently i n the h i s t o r i c a l 
controversy over realism. Neither of these forms, then, can 
reasonably be ignored; but i t would seem to be j u s t i f i a b l e 
to s i m p l i f y the discussion by l i m i t i n g i t to painting and 
l i t e r a t u r e . I f a general theory of realism i s possible at 
a l l , i t ought to be feasible to base i t upon these two 
extreme cases, and apply i t , no doubt with certain 
modifications, to the other representational a r t s , such as 
ballet;, opera, cinema and so on. 
The d i s t i n c t i o n , drawn above, between representation 
and statement, and the concept of representation as a pseudo-
r e a l i t y , might now, themselves, seem inadequate. For they 
sound as though they apply to painting more than to 
l i t e r a t u r e . But a more careful analysis of representation i n 
l i t e r a t u r e shows that t h i s i s not so. Although i t i s 
composed of statements, a narrative poem or a novel (as 
d i s t i n c t from, say, a meditative poem or a text-book) 
describes, not the r e a l world or our thoughts about i t , but 
a pseudo-reality. And i t i s t h i s pseudo-reality, i t s events 
and characters, which constitute the representational 
element i n l i t e r a t u r e . The pseudo-reality of the book w i l l 
almost always contain elements from the real world, specific 
places, h i s t o r i c a l periods and so on; but these (as Margaret 
Macdonald suggests) (1) may be considered as functioning 
(1) 'The Language of F i c t i o n ' i n Philosophy Looks at the Arts 
ed. Margolis. 
(17) 
at the same l e v e l of pseudo-reality as the rest of the 
representation. 
The sort of representation which i s found i n l i t e r a t u r e 
could perhaps be described as " i n d i r e c t representation". The 
words and the physical structure of the book are not, as a 
r u l e , although there are exceptions,the representational 
element. The representation i s the state of a f f a i r s to whidh 
they r e f e r . The differences between direct and i n d i r e c t modes 
of representation might help to account f o r the variations 
of emphasis between painting and l i t e r a t u r e , and the 
d i f f e r e n t views of realism which arise i n each a r t . With 
d i r e c t representation, realism of representation i s not 
divorced from the technique used to create the physical work 
of a r t . Thus the discussion of realism i n painting tends to 
centre around the painter's technique, and the 
v e r i s i m i l i t u d e of-what he produces - a v e r i s i m i l i t u d e which, 
taken to extremes, culminates i n the immediate visual i l l u s i o n 
of the trompe I ' o e i l . The realism of the i n d i r e c t 
representation of l i t e r a t u r e tends t o be considered much 
more i n terms of subject-matter; since i t i s not so much 
the language and structure of the book which are 
representational as the "story" which i t t e l l s , and which i s 
assessed by c r i t e r i a , not of i l l u s i o n , but of p r o b a b i l i t y 
and consistency. There i s no analogy of the trompe I ' o e i l 
i n l i t e r a t u r e ( unless one could claim that the sense of 
involvement, of ac t u a l l y being there, which sometimes 
arises i n the reading of a book, was a genuine case of 
i l l u s i o n , which i s very questionable). There i s , however, 
a corresponding form of i n d i r e c t i l l u s i o n , by which a 
(18) 
f i c t i o n a l story can be taken f o r a fa c t u a l report. 
The d i s t i n c t i o n between l i t e r a t u r e and painting, 
between d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t representation, i s not meant to 
hol^i absolutely and i n a l l cases. There are modes of l i t e r a r y 
w r i t i n g , such as Joyce's stream-of-consciousness technique, 
or the Journal technique frequently employed by other w r i t e r s , 
i n which the words of the book themselves have a 
representational f u n c t i o n , and which constitute an attempt 
t o make l i t e r a t u r e approximate to a realism of a more direct 
v a r i e t y . There are also examples of painters and c r i t i c s f o r 
whom realism i n p a i n t i n g i s a matter of subject as well as 
of technique. I f every picture t e l l s a story (and 
representational paintings c e r t a i n l y can be seen i n such a 
l i g h t , ) then the p i c t o r i a l story, what i s happening or 
portrayed i n the p i c t u r e , can be judged as r e a l i s t i c on the 
same kind of grounds of p r o b a b i l i t y as a story i n l i t e r a t u r e . 
I t would be a mistake to describe t h i s as an example of 
i n d i r e c t representation i n painting; rather, i t i s the 
t r a n s f e r r i n g of the l i t e r a r y emphasis on realism of subject-
matter t o the s|ihere of painting, where, because of the 
di r e c t mode of representation, such an emphasis does not tend 
to arise n a t u r a l l y . Linda Nochlin's book. Realism , i s mairily 
concerned w i t h realism i n t h i s sense, but i t i s not what i s 
immediately understood by realism i n the visual a r t s . 
Thus i t i s hardly surprising that attitudes to realism 
i n p a i n t i n g and l i t e r a t u r e are often very d i f f e r e n t ; f o r one 
kind of realism n a t u r a l l y comes to the fore of our thoughts 
about realism i n painting, and another with reference to 
l i t e r a t u r e . To t a l k about realism of subject and technique 
(19) 
might seem to be drawing a false d i s t i n c t i o n , since i t i s 
sometimes argued that subject and technique are inseparable. 
But although they may be inseparable i n practice, i t might 
s t i l l be possible to draw a v a l i d t h e o r e t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n 
between them. Even t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s not always clear-cut, 
and there may w e l l be cases when i t i s impossible to say 
whether something i s an aspect of subject or technique, but 
i t i s a s u f f i c i e n t l y clear d i s t i n c t i o n to be of use. There 
does seem to be a conceptual difference between the two kinds 
of realism, a difference which determines the kind of c r i t e r i a 
( p r o b a b i l i t y or i l l u s i o n ) by which realism i s i d e n t i f i e d , and 
which tends t o correspond t o the difference between cases 
where we t a l k about " t r u t h " and those where we t a l k about 
" i m i t a t i o n " . But the fact that such a d i s t i n c t i o n can be 
drawn does not, as has already been argued, solve the problem 
of our c o n f l i c t i n g assumptions about realism, but merely 
separates them. 
I I I . Is Resemblance Possible? 
The c r i t e r i o n of realism has not only been accused of 
being so vague as to be inapplicable; but also of being, at 
least as i t i s usually interpreted, fundamentally inconsistent. 
The d i s t i n c t i o n between representation and language, the 
natural and thfi. conventional sign, which I have so f a r been 
assuming, has been strenuously denied, and the whole idea 
of a work of a r t being " l i k e " r e a l i t y has been attacked as 
naive and meaningless. The most f o r c e f u l attack comes from 
Nelson Goodman, i n Languages of Art : 
"The p l a i n f a c t i s that a picture, to represent 
an object, must be a symbol f o r i t , stand f o r i t , 
r e f e r to i t : and that no degree of resemblance i s 
(20)) 
s u f f i c i e n t to establish the requisite r e l a t i o n -
ship of reference: almost anything may stand 
f o r almost anything else. A picture that 
represents - l i k e a passage that describes - an 
object, refers t o i t and, more p a r t i c u l a r l y , 
denotes i t . . Denotation i s the core of 
representation and i s independent of resemblance." 
(1) 
What i s controversial here i s not the denial that resemblance 
i s a s u f f i c i e n t condition f o r representation; nor yet the 
denial that i t i s a necessary condition f o r reference: but 
the equation of representation ( i n t h i s sense) with 
reference, and the consequent claim, that resemblance i s not 
a necessary condition f o r representation either. Goodman 
claims t j i a t the difference between depiction and description, 
i s one of degree rather than kind, based on the r e l a t i v e 
"density" of the symbol-schemes involved. The same kind of 
point i s made, somewhat less emphatically, by Gombrich, i n 
Art and I l l u s i o n : 
"Everything points to the conclusion that the 
phrase 'the language of a r t ' i s more than a 
loose metaphor, that even t o describe the world 
int images,, we need a developed system of 
schemata." (2) 
Both w r i t e r s are l e d , by t h e i r insistence upon the notion of 
a "language of a r t " , to define realism i n a r t , not i n terms 
of resemblance, but wi t h reference to t r u t h and the symbol 
(1) Languages of Art p.5 
(2) Art and I l l u s i o n p.76 
(21) 
system, Goodman's view being a q u a l i f i c a t i o n of Gombrich's : 
"those who understand the notation w i l l derive 
no false information from the drawing." (1) 
"How correct the picture i s under the system 
depends upon how accurate i s the information 
about the object that i s obtained by reading 
the picture according to that system. But how 
l i t e r a l or r e a l i s t i c the picture i s depends upon. 
how standard the system i s . " (2) 
More important f o r the present purpose than the idea of 
a language of a r t , which only applies to the visual a r t s , are 
the reasons which led Goodman and Gombrich to think that such 
a concept was necessary - reasons which apply also to l i t e r a t u r e , 
(Goodman and Gombrich do not apply them to l i t e r a t u r e 
presiamably because they take i t to be self-evident that 
l i t e r a r y representation i s a matter of symbolism, an 
assumption which has already been questioned.) They are led 
to conceive of representation i n terms of symbolism rather 
than s i m i l a r i t y because of the alleged i m p o s s i b i l i t y of 
creating i n a work of a r t something which i s " l i k e " r e a l i t y . 
The most important obstacles i n the way of the creation of 
such a likeness are the l i m i t a t i o n s of the medium, which 
lead t o a r t i s t i c conventions, and the s u b j e c t i v i t y of the 
a r t i s t ' s awareness, as manifested i n styl e and treatment. 
These obstacles do not apply only to visual a r t . Because of 
the i n d i r e c t mode of representation i n l i t e r a t u r e , the 
w r i t e r i s less l i m i t e d than the a r t i s t by his medium, except 
as regards considerations of manageability. But the problem 
(1) Art and I l l u s i o n p.78 
(2) Languages of Art p.38 
(22) 
of the s u b j e c t i v i t y of the w r i t e r , and the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of 
incomplete representation, i s just as great, i f not greater, 
i n the context of l i t e r a t u r e . 
There i s also an unrelated minor objection to the theory 
that realism i s a matter of resemblance, which i s raised i n 
passing by Goodman; and i t i s as w e l l to look at i t f i r s t , 
before going on to the more important objections. Goodman's 
argument i s concerned w i t h f i c t i o n s i n a r t . The existence of 
r e a l i s t i c f i c t i o n s , he says, i s incompatible with the idea 
that r e a l i s t i c representations are l i k e the real thing; 
because i n t h i s case, there i s no re a l thing f o r them to be 
l i k e : 
"The copy theory of representation takes a f u r t h e r 
beating here: f o r where a representation does 
not represent anything, there can be no question, 
of resemblance to what i t represents." (1) 
Goodman here seems to be ignoring the fact that we^  can 
t a l k quite consistently of something being l i k e a kind of 
t h i n g , as wel l as being l i k e a p a r t i c u l a r thing. This i s 
what i s involved V7henever we say that something i s l i k e an 
X, rather than l i k e the x; and of the two phrases, both 
w i t h i n and outside the realm of representation, the former 
woxild seem to be the more usual. To take Goodman's example 
of Pickwick: Goodman claims that the realism of Pickwick 
cannot be a matter of being l i k e r e a l i t y , because there i s , 
i n r e a l i t y , no Pickwick on which he was modelled. He implies 
that i n order to say that Pickwick resembles r e a l i t y , i t 
(1) Languages of Art p.25 
(23) 
would have to be possible to say that he was a "likeness of 
a-man-called-Pickwick". He ignores the alte r n a t i v e p o s s i b i l i t y 
of saying that he i s a convincing "likeness-of-a-man 
cal l e d Pickwick" , which seems to be a better analysis. The 
p a r t i c u l a r i z e d representation of a man i n a work of art i s 
compared, not w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r r e a l man, nor even with a 
type of re a l man, but wi t h r e a l men i n general. How we 
ac t u a l l y manage to assess t h i s sort of generic likeness i s 
a problem which need not concern us here. I t i s enough to 
re a l i s e that there i s nothing inherently i l l o g i c a l about 
saying that something i s l i k e a rea l thing, but not l i k e 
any p a r t i c u l a r r e a l t h i n g . This does not, of course, mean 
that r e a l i s t i c representations are generalized types. One of 
the ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s of real things i n general i s that they 
are i n d i v i d u a l s ; and therefore a r e a l i s t i c representation 
must also be one which i s indivi d u a l i z e d ; but i t need not 
be the representation of any actual i n d i v i d u a l . 
The same kind of argument works when transferred from 
the l e v e l of f i c t i t i o u s e n t i t i e s to that of f i c t i t i o u s 
kinds of things, as w i t h Goodman's other example of the 
unicorn. We could not say that a representation of a unicoim 
was l i k e a r e a l unicorn; but we could s t i l l say that i t was 
l i k e a r e a l animal, and even analyse i t f u r t h e r , saying 
tha t i t s hoofs were l i k e r e a l hoofs, and so on. As long as 
the idea of resemblance t o a kind of thing i s admitted, as 
I t h i n k i t should be, then f i c t i o n s do not appear to pose 
any more problems f o r a theory of representation and 
realism based on the concept of resemblance. The concept of 
realism, however, can only be applied to f i c t i t i o u s kinds 
(24) 
of things, as opposed to f i c t i t i o u s i n d i viduals, i n the 
v i s u a l a r t s , where realism i s a matter of technique as well, 
as subject. A pa i n t i n g of Saint George and the Dragon, or a 
Surrea l i s t painting by D a l i , might w e l l q u a l i f y to be 
call e d " r e a l i s t i c " i n one sense, although a book with the 
same subject would not. Even with regard to painting, we 
might f e e l the need to q u a l i f y our a t t r i b u t i o n of the l a b e l 
" r e a l i s t i c " . The basic concept of realism, the one i n r e l a t i o n 
t o which most of the problems which we are discussing arise, 
i s the concept of the f a i t h f u l reproduction of kinds of 
things, which are represented just as they are i n r e a l l i f e . 
F i c t i t i o u s i n d ividuals are not excluded from t h i s concept of 
realism, but f i c t i t i o u s classes of things have a much more 
doubtful status. 
The idea of; generic resemblances may also help to 
explain why realism i s associated with a norm of experience; 
and why anything which i s too f a r removed from that norm, 
although possible, and perhaps even h i s t o r i c a l l y true, i s 
not accepted as r e a l i s t i c . 
I t i s necessary now to tur n to the more important and 
widespread c r i t i c i s m s of the idea that we can t a l k of a 
representation being l i k e r e a l i t y : the related problems of 
convention and s u b j e c t i v i t y . The l i m i t a t i o n s of the medium, 
so the argument runs, make i t impossible to create something 
which i s a genuine likeness of what i s seen or experienced. 
As Gombrich says of r e a l i s t i c painting: 
" I t i s not a f a i t h f u l record of a vis u a l 
experience, but the f a i t h f u l construction of a 
(25) 
r e l a t i o n a l model."(1) 
And seeing and experiencing are, themselves, not the 
passive reception of s t i m \ i l i from the external world, but 
the active construction by the mind of an i n t e l l i g i b l e 
universe, an a c t i v i t y i n which perception and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
cannot be divorced: 
"The innocent eye i s a myth...The whole 
d i s t i n c t i o n between sensation and perception, 
plausible as i t was, had to be given up i n the 
face of the evidence from experiments with 
human beings and animals. Nobody has ever seen 
a v i s u a l sensation, not even the impressionists, 
however ingenuously they stalked t h e i r prey." (2) 
"there i s no innocent eye. The eye comes always 
ancient to i t s work, obsessed by i t s own past 
and by old and new insinuations of the ear, 
nose, tongue, f i n g e r s , heart and brain...not 
only how, but also what i t sees i s regulated by 
need and prejudice. I t selects, r e j e c t s , 
organizes,discriminates, associates,classifies, 
analyses, constructs. I t does not so much , 
mirror as take and make." (3) 
But neither of these objections shows that a 
representation cannot be l i k e r e a l i t y . What they do show i s 
that a representation w i l l not be a f a i t h f u l reproduction, 
i n every respect, of some sort of noumenal world, and that 
(1.) Art and I l l u s i o n p. 78 
(2) Art and I l l u s i o n p. 252 
(3) Languages of Art p. 7 
(26) 
i s a very d i f f e r e n t t h i n g . I have already argued that the 
r e a l i t y i n question must be a phenomenal r e a l i t y . And a 
resemblance i s not necessarily an absolute or perfect 
resemblance. Indeed, on some theories,absolute resemblance 
would con s t i t u t e i d e n t i t y . Neither objection prevents us 
from t a l k i n g meaningfully about a resemblance between 
representation and r e a l i t y ; and as long as we can do t h i s , 
the t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of " r e a l i s t i c " w i l l be 
acceptable. I t would perhaps help, though, to examine the 
objections a l i t t l e more closely. 
When Goodman, and s.ometimes even Gombrich, t a l k about 
conventions i n a r t , they make i t sound as though the whole 
representation i s a symbolic composition. This i s because 
c e r t a i n aspects of the r e a l world; l i g h t , f o r instance, or 
the t h i r d dimension, cannot be d i r e c t l y reproduced i n a 
pai n t i n g , but have to be i n some way translated in t o a r t i s t i c 
terms. ( This i s an argument which has more force with 
reference to pain t i n g and drawing than to l i t e r a t u r e . 
There are representational conventions i n l i t e r a t u r e , too, 
but these tend to be of a d i f f e r e n t kind, based on the need 
to r e s t r i c t what i s represented to a manageable scale, 
rather than the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of reproducing the effects 
of l i f e i n a p a r t i c u l a r medixam. They are usually selective 
conventions, such as the concentration on one or two major 
characters or si t u a t i o n s ) But i t i s surely possible to 
accept the undeniable f a c t that there must be some 
conventions i n a representation, without concluding from 
(27) 
t h i s that the whole t h i n g i s conventional. 
A much better view of convention i n a r t , i s that of 
Harry Levin, who speaks of l i t e r a r y conventions as a 
"necessary difference between a r t and l i f e " ( 1 ) , thus 
apparently implying that there i s a more fundamental 
r e l a t i o n s h i p of resemblance i n the background, A s i m i l a r 
analysis i s given by J.L.Lowes: 
"An a r t i s t sets t o work to paint a landscape. 
But the landscape has three dimensions; the f l a t 
surface has but tv70. Out of the l i m i t a t i o n s of 
his medium he must construct a set of symbols 
that w i l l give to the plane the appearance of 
depth." (2) 
The j u x t a p o s i t i o n of "symbol" and "appearance" here seems 
to indicate a c e r t a i n confusion; but i t can also be seen as 
a recognition of the f a c t that convention and resemblance 
are not incompatible, but can both be present i n a 
representation. 
Convention, then, does not rule out the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
resemblance. A convsntion, as a "necessary difference" 
between a r t and l i f e , can best be seen, not as an obstacle 
to realism, but as a f a c t o r which l i m i t s and defines the 
area to which r e a l i s t i c c r i t e r i a can be applied. What vie 
accept by convention i n representation i s not a complete 
system of symbols, but simply which aspects of resemblance 
are, and which are not, to count as relevant i n a work i n a 
p a r t i c u l a r medium or s t y l e . There i s no need at a l l to 
(1) The Gates of Horn p.l8 
(2) Convention and Revolt i n Poetry p . l 
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abandon the idea of resemblance altogether, i n favour of 
the apparently more sophisticated notion of a "language of 
a r t " . 
On the other hand, conventions themselves cannot be 
judged or compared from the point of view of realism. For a 
convention, by d e f i n i t i o n , i s not r e a l i s t i c . This seems to 
be the source of much of the confusion about, f o r example. 
Impressionism. For i n the conventions of Impressionism, a 
resemblance based on l i g h t and atmosphere takes precedence 
over the t r a d i t i o n a l emphasis on a resemblance based on 
f i g u r e and o u t l i n e ; and i t i s impossible to say that the 
one kind of painting i s more r e a l i s t i c than the other. 
Neither i s the argument from the s u b j e c t i v i t y of the 
a r t i s t any more compelling. At one l e v e l , i t seems to be 
denying the p o s s i b i l i t y of realism by denying the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of o b j e c t i v i t y i n any context - a move which leaves the 
contrary notion of s u b j e c t i v i t y l i t t l e more than vacuous. 
Taken at another l e v e l , i t shows only that resemblances 
between a r t and r e a l i t y may be at best imperfect; but t h i s 
does not amount to a denial of resemblance altogether. 
A part of the force of t h i s "innocent eye" argument -
that i s , the argxament which denies the existence of the 
innocent eye, and of the innocent mind as well - i s derived 
from the idea that the inevitable conceptualization of 
experience means that we are never aware of things as they 
are i n themselves, of Kant's noumenal r e a l i t y , but only of 
the phenomenal world of our own experiences. Thus the a r t i s t 
can never copy r e a l i t y , since he i s never aware of i t . But 
(29) 
i t i s a mistake to equate " r e a l " w i th things i n themselves; 
and to say that a l l . experience involves i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and 
s u b j e c t i v i t y denies significance to either word. The 
phenomenal v;orld, although i t may be a human construct, i s 
both stable and consistent enough to give meaning to the 
notion of o b j e c t i v i t y , and a standard against which we can 
te s t "subjective" deviations. As David Pole points out, a l l 
that the concept of realism demands i s not "innocent eyes", 
but only "shared so p h i s t i c a t i o n " ( 1 ) . 
This need to give some content to the idea of 
o b j e c t i v i t y i n experience, before we can complain about i t s 
s u b j e c t i v i t y , i s very s i m i l a r to a d i s t i n c t i o n drawn i n a 
s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t way, and i n a psychological, rather than 
a philosophical context, by Rudolph Arnheim. This d i s t i n c t i o n 
i s relevant here because i t i s prompted by an inconsistency 
i n Gombrich's treatment of the psychology of representation 
i n Art and I l l u s i o n . Writing from the point of view of 
Gestalt psychology, Arnheim objects to Gombrich's f a i l u r e 
t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e between the influence of perceptual 
organization and the influence of schemata derived from past 
experience, w h i l s t at the same time i t i s one of Gombrich's 
main theses i n the book that the development of realism 
proceeds by the t e s t i n g of h i s t o r i c a l schemata against 
actual experience. This p o s i t i o n does seem to imply that 
organization i n experience can be l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to the 
influence of h i s t o r i c a l schemata, which l a t t e r , with some 
e f f o r t , can be shaken o f f : 
"a t h e o r i s t cannot invoke appeals to the standaiEds 
(1) 'Goodman, and the Naive View of Representation' 
B r i t i s h Journal of Aesthetics 1974 
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of nature i f he asserts at the same time that 
the view of nature i s always a product of 
t r a d i t i o n a l , schemata." (1) 
Thus the argument from the s u b j e c t i v i t y of the a r t i s t 
can e a s i l y be carried to an imacceptable extreme; and once 
we do draw a s i g n i f i c a n t d i s t i n c t i o n between subjective and 
objective, i t becomes much less plausible to suppose that a 
representation can never be r e a l i s t i c . I n simple cases, as 
Gombrich himself points out, a copy can be as free from 
s u b j e c t i v i t y , i n any meaningful sense of the word,, .as . 
anything could possibly be: 
"So complex i s the information that reaches us 
from the v i s i b l e world that no picture w i l l ever 
embody i t a l l . That i s liat due to the 
s u b j e c t i v i t y of v i s i o n but to i t s richness. 
Where the a r t i s t has to copy a human product, 
he can, of course, produce a facsimile which i s 
indistinguishable from the o r i g i n a l . The forger 
of bank-notes succeeds only too wel l i n effacirjg 
his personality and the l i m i t a t i o n s of a period 
s t y l e . " (2) 
Nobody would deny tfeat there i s a l l the difference i n the 
world between forging a bank-note and painting a landscape. 
The l a t t e r could not conceivably achieve anything l i k e the 
accuracy of the former. Yet once we re a l i s e , as the bank-
note example helps us to do, that we are not completely cut 
(1) Towards a Psychology of Art p.160 
(2) Art and I l l u s i o n p.78 
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o f f behind a b a r r i e r of s u b j e c t i v i t y , the fact that perhaps 
every representation i s to some extent di s t o r t e d need not 
worry us unduly. For the very idea of d i s t o r t i o n i n t h i s 
context i s p a r a s i t i c upon the idea of resemblance; and 
d i s t o r t i o n i s subject t o degrees, ranging from a, very close 
approximation to the subject to a wide deviation from i t : 
that; i s , from the r e a l i s t i c to the u n r e a l i s t i c . Neither 
necessary differences, nor necessarily imperfect s i m i l a r i t i e s 
need force us to deny that a representation can be " l i k e " 
or "unlike" r e a l i t y . 
I t i s important t o r e a l i s e , then, that a resemblance 
does not have to be perfect or absolute i n order to be a 
resemblance. This point i s made by J.W..Manns, i n an a r t i c l e 
i n which he c r i t i c i z e s Goodman f o r operating with a concept 
of absolute resemblance, wh i l s t his concepts of realism-
and representation are r e l a t i v e and admit of convention. 
Manns points out that resemblances, too, can be r e l a t i v e 
and conventional; a fa c t which helps to defend the common-
sense notion of realism from Goodman's attack: 
"" R e a l i s t i c representation depends...upon 
inc i a c a t i o n . ' And can' t we now say the same of 
resemblance as well? Some aspects of 
resemblance are more commonly singled out than 
others. I t i s these which we take as natural."(1) 
That resemblances can be incomplete and r e l a t i v e i s a. 
fac t which helps to counter another objection, of Goodman's: 
that representations can be used to c l a s s i f y something, to 
(1)'Representation, Relativism and Resemblance* 
B r i t i s h Journal of Aesthetics 1971 
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represent i t as something. This function can just as 
plausibly be seen^as performed by selecting c e r t a i n 
resemblances i n preference to others. Goodman's assumption; 
that resemblance cannot be used i n a c l a s s i f i c a t o r y way i s 
another conclusion from his absolute concept of resemblance, 
and does not seem to be J u s t i f i e d , 
Realism must, therefore, be considered as r e l a t i v e i n 
many ways. This does not mean, however, that there i s no way 
i n which we can say that one work of a r t i s more r e a l i s t i c 
than another. A p a i n t i n g or a book f a i l s to be r e a l i s t i c , 
not by f a i l i n g to reproduce r e a l i t y w i t h complete accuracy 
and i n i t s e n t i r e t y , but by s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i s t o r t i n g the 
representation w i t h i n the relevant frame of reference 
imposed by convention and s t y l e , or when what i s represented 
i s not the kind of t h i n g which i s to be found i n the r e a l 
world. Realism, and especially realism as a moral p r i n c i p l e , 
demands not only the maximum possible f i d e l i t y of 
representation, but also the representation of r e a l kinds of 
things. Greater realism may also be a t t r i b u t e d to works i n 
wjjich the number of relevant areas of resemblance i s greater. 
Hence d e t a i l i s often a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of realism. 
The relevant c r i t e r i a of realism, then, can be applied 
i n a straightforward and unambiguous way, i n spite of the 
f a c t that realism i s never absolute. I t s r e l a t i v i t y does 
not mgike realism a less manageable or useful concept f o r 
c r i t i c i s m and aesthetics. 
On the whole, then, the common-sense concept of realism. 
(33) 
i s not as naive and inapplicable as i t i s sometimes made out 
to be. I t does make sense to ask whether or not a 
representation i s " l i k e r e a l i t y " . I t therefore also makes 
sense t o ask i f a representation ought to be l i k e r e a l i t y . 
(34)/ 
Chapter 2: The Aesthetic Argument 
The aesthetic argument claims that realism i s not a r t . 
I t i s based on the recognition of the fa c t that what we 
value i n art i s never realism alone; and those other 
q u a l i t i e s which we do claim to require i n a r t are not only 
very d i f f e r e n t from realism, but also, i n many ways, 
opposed t o i t . The mimetic theory of a r t , which would make 
of realism the fundamental aesthetic q u a l i t y , i s untenable 
without modification. And the modifications of the mimetic 
theory i m p l i c i t l y subordinate realism to characteristics 
which are eventually realised to be unrelated to i t , and 
even incompatible w i t h i t . 
I . The Mimetic Theory 
The mimetic theory i s the theory that a r t i s the 
i m i t a t i o n of l i f e and nature. I t has been very widely held, 
and very d i f f e r e n t l y interpreted, from the time of Plato 
and A r i s t o t l e onwards. But, taken i n i t s most l i t e r a l sense, 
as i t must be i f i t i s t o be considered as the t h e o r e t i c a l 
basis f o r realism, i t has severe l i m i t a t i o n s as a complete 
or general theory of a r t . This i s refl e c t e d i n the fa c t that 
the i m i t a t i v e element i s , i m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y , always 
subordinated t o something else, whether the b e a u t i f u l , the 
sublime, the i d e a l , the i n s t r u c t i v e , or whatever. I t i s 
d i f f i c u l t to f i n d anybody who holds a purely mimetic theory 
of a r t , although many people have held a mimetic theory i n 
conjimction w i t h a theory of some other kind. 
One of the explanations of the need to q u a l i f y the 
(35) 
mimetic theory i s that i t cannot very easily function as a 
general theory of a r t because there are so many forms of a r t 
to which i t s a p p l i c a t i o n seems quite inappropriate. The idea 
of. i m i t a t i o n , as we now understand i t , although perf e c t l y 
acceptable i n the context of representation, seems very 
awkward when applied to such art forms as music, architecture 
and modern painting. A r i s t o t l e does t r y to consider a l l a r t 
forms as i m i t a t i v e , i n a broader sense(l), but there i s a 
d i s t i n c t asymmetricality between the way i n which a story or 
a pi c t u r e can be said to be an i m i t a t i o n of l i f e , and the 
way i n which music can be said to be one. This l i m i t e d 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the mimetic theory leads to a search f o r a 
more general d e f i n i t i o n of a r t , which w i l l apply equally to 
abstract painting, music or l i t e r a t u r e : a d e f i n i t i o n of art 
i n terms of, f o r example, form or expression. 
But the main objection to the mimetic theory i s that i t 
i s simply inadequate. We thin k that a r t must be something 
more than jus t the reproduction of the e x i s t i n g world. Often 
quoted i n t h i s context i s the remark, a t t r i b u t e d to Rebecca 
West, that " a copy of the universe i s not what i s required 
of a r t ; one of the damned t h i n g i s ample." I t should be 
recognized, however, that there i s nothing l o g i c a l l y 
inconsistent about saying that art i s essentially the 
i m i t a t i o n of r e a l i t y . The only inconsistency here i s between 
the implications of the mimetic theory and our t r a d i t i o n a l 
esteem f o r a r t . I f we were w i l l i n g to admit that a r t i s 
perhaps t r i v i a l , or i s at best a substitute f o r , or record 
of, r e a l i t y , thus subordinating art to l i f e i t s e l f or to 
( l ) Poetics chap.l 
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other human a c t i v i t i e s , such as science or hi s t o r y ; then 
there would be no objection t o the i m i t a t i o n theory. One 
w r i t e r who comes closer to accepting a pure mimetic theory 
than most, i s Chernishevsky. And he asserts at the same time 
that t r a d i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e s to a r t are distorted and exagger-
ated: 
"When one considers how strongly entrenched the 
opinion i s that the beauty of a work of art i s 
supposedly greater than beauty i n nature, the 
briefness of our analysis may r e a l l y be a f a u l t ; 
t h i s opinion i s , however, so shaky, the 
exponents of i t so contradict themselves at 
every step, that i t would only seem necessary to 
ca l l - a t t e n t i o n to how imjust t h i s opinion i s 
f o r everyone t o see that beauty i n real l i f e i s 
superior t o any product of the 'creative' 
imagination" (1) 
But t h i s i s a step which few are w i l l i n g or brave enough to 
take, and a d e f i n i t i o n of a r t i s expected also to be a 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a r t , a rol e i n which the mimetic theory i s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y unsatisfactory. 
This whole problem of the inadequacy of i m i t a t i o n as a 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a r t was made a l l the more acute by the 
development of photography. This forced people to search f o r 
a; d e f i n i t i o n of painting i n p a r t i c u l a r , and art i n general, 
through which i t could be seen that a rt has a value 
xuiattainable by the mechanical reproduction of r e a l i t y i n a 
photograph. The value of a painting was consequently sought 
i n areas other than i t s i m i t a t i o n ofi the real world; and 
(1.) L i f e and Aesthetics:( DMLR p.5^ 
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here again ideas such as form, expression and c r e a t i v i t y 
come t o the f o r e . I t i s now almost universally recognized, 
and, I think,; r i g h t l y so, that a purely mimetic theory of a r t 
i s untenable. I n f a c t , t h i s seems always to have been 
recognized, but not e x p l i c i t l y stated, with the re s u l t that 
the mimetic theory was constantly being modified and 
q u a l i f i e d , but never actually rejected. What has been 
happening i n more recent aesthetics i s that the implications 
of well-established assumptions about the value and nature 
of a r t are being made more e x p l i c i t , and taken to t h e i r 
l o g i c a l conclusions: the conclusions that art i s not 
i m i t a t i o n , and t h a t , therefore, realism i s not a r t . This 
i s what I have called the aesthetic argument against 
realism. 
I I , , The Aesthetic Argument 
An aesthetic argument, i n t h i s sense, i s one which i s 
concerned with what i s , or i s not, a r t . According to a 
d e f i n i t i o n , or at least a description of a r t , i t attempts 
to i d e n t i f y and assess a r t i s t i c value; i n t h i s case, the 
a r t i s t i c value of realism. This broad sense of "aestjietic" 
shovild be distinguished from the more specific sense i n 
whiBh an "aesthetic" argument i s an argument f o r pure art or 
aestheticism: theories which maintain tfecat a r t serves no 
p r a c t i c a l or moral purpose. I n the more general sense, an 
aesthetic argument i s not committed to denying a moral or 
p r a c t i c a l f u n c t i o n t o a r t . Such a function must, however, be 
part of the d e f i n i t i o n of a r t i t s e l f , and not something 
external t o i t . An aesthetic argument makes no appeal to 
considerations other than a r t i s t i c ones; but the way a r t i s 
(38) 
defined, as long as the d e f i n i t i o n i s consistent, does not 
matter. Thus something l i k e Tolstoy's communication theory, 
which i s usually used as an i l l u s t r a t i o n of a mo r a l i s t i c , as 
opposed to a purely aesthetic, approach to a r t , could be 
seen, i n t h i s case, as the basis of an aesthetic argument. 
One objection to the way i n which almost a l l aesthetic 
arguments are formulated i s that specific d e f i n i t i o n s of art 
are always inadequate. Art, as a human i n s t i t u t i o n , i s 
extremely f l e x i b l e , and tends to be d i f f e r e n t things at 
d i f f e r e n t times - just what i t i s depending to a great extent 
upon which d e f i n i t i o n s happen to be i n vogue at the time. To 
attempt t o define a r t s p e c i f i c a l l y as expression, the 
creation of s i g n i f i c a n t form, the i m i t a t i o n of the b e a u t i f u l , 
and so on, seems to be misguided, f o r a r t can.be a l l of 
these, and much more besides. But t h i s does not necessarily 
i n v a l i d a t e the aesthetic arguments against realism. Where 
the d e f i n i t i o n s of ar t upon which such arguments are based, 
are h e l p f u l , i s i n drawing a t t e n t i o n to some of the most 
important kinds of assumptions we make about a r t , and the 
sort of q u a l i t i e s which we consider t o make i t worthwhile. 
We should therefore look at the arguments derived from some 
of the major d e f i n i t i o n s of a r t , not thi n k i n g of them so much 
as r i v a l theories about what art i s , but i n order to see how 
some of our most deeply—rooted convictions about art relate 
t o realism. 
To t a l k about "the" aesthetic argument about realism 
sounds wrong. For there are as many such arguments as there 
are d e f i n i t i o n s of a r t . But the same preoccupations and 
structure can be seen running through a l l of them, and i t 
(39) 
i s simpler to t h i n k of one general argument, manifesting 
i t s e l f i n d i f f e r e n t forms, and w i t h d i f f e r e n t emphases,rather 
than a number of separate ones. One w r i t e r who draws together 
many of the main threads of the aesthetic argument i s 
Etienne Gilson, i n Painting and Reality. Although his own 
analysis of a r t i s rather an i n d i v i d u a l one, and i n spite of 
the f a c t that he deals only w i t h painting, Gilson's approach 
to realism i n t h i s book r e f l e c t s most of the major concerns 
of aesthetic arguments i n general. 
As has already been suggested, the aesthetic argument 
arises out of the need to f i n d a d e f i n i t i o n of art which can 
also explain and j u s t i f y the esteem i n which i t i s 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y held. Two c r i t e r i a of an acceptable d e f i n i t i o n 
of a r t , from t h i s point of view, are that i t must allocate 
to a r t a function which a r t alone can f u l f i l l . , or postulate 
a q u a l i t y peculiar to a r t ; and i t must show that such a 
f u n c t i o n or q u a l i t y i s worthwhile. The mimetic theory seems 
to be unable to do e i t h e r of these things, and thus needs 
to be modified, i f not abandoned. This preoccupation with the 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a r t i s shown quite c l e a r l y by Gilson: 
"To duplicate r e a l objects by a series of images 
without substance of t h e i r own i s , to say the 
l e a s t , a pastime more suitable to youth than to 
persons who have reached i n t e l l e c t u a l maturity. 
The only explanation of t h i s phenomenon i s that 
paintings serve some purpose of t h e i r own that 
i s not served, or that i s less w e l l served, by 
(40) 
the things c o n s t i t u t i n g the world of nature." (L) 
Another w r i t e r whose version of the aesthetic argument 
against realism i s e x p l i c i t l y based on the same considerations 
i s Olive B e l l , who says i n the Preface t o Art: 
"Everyone i n his heart believes that there i s a 
r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n between works of art and a l l 
other objects; t h i s b e l i e f my hypothesis 
j u s t i f i e s . We a l l f e e l that a r t i s immensely 
important; my hypothesis affords reason f o r 
t h i n k i n g i t so." (2) 
This seems to be the st a r t i n g - p o i n t of the aesthetic 
argument: the b e l i e f that a r t must be d i f f e r e n t from other 
objects i n the world, and from other human a c t i v i t i e s ; and 
d i f f e r e n t i n a way ahich i s worthwhile. There i s nothing 
l o g i c a l l y necessary or self-evident about t h i s b e l i e f . I t 
would be p e r f e c t l y consistent to argue that art i s not very 
important, and i s ess e n t i a l l y just a copy of r e a l i t y . But 
Clive Bell's appeal to "everyone", although rather rash, 
does not seem to be much of an exaggeration, and the b e l i e f 
that a r t i s important, and that s a t i s f a c t o r y d e f i n i t i o n s of 
a r t would j u s t i f y and explain that importance, i s not one 
w i t h which I wish to quarrel. 
The ways i n which a r t i s distinguished from other 
aspects of l i f e are various. Gilson touches upon the most 
important ones. I n the f i r s t place, the a c t i v i t y of the 
a r t i s t i s distinguished from other a c t i v i t i e s ; and the 
(1) Painting and Reality p.170 
(2) Art p.v 
(41) 
a c t i v i t y from which i t seems most important to distinguish 
i t , p a r t i c u l a r l y where realism i s concerned, i s that of 
science. The t r a d i t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n i s drawn between the 
cognitive a c t i v i t y of the s c i e n t i s t and the creative 
a c t i v i t y of the a r t i s t : 
" I n the case of painting, a rt i s not nature 
seen through a temperament; rather, i t i s the 
a b i l i t y to create a new being that nobody would 
ever see, eith e r i n nature or otherwise, unless 
the a r t of the painter caused i t t o e x i s t . " ( l ) 
The d i s t i n c t i o n i s a very old one, and i t i s not, as i t i s 
i n Gilson's example, always confined to painting. A classic 
statement of the difference between a r t i s t and s c i e n t i s t 
comes in . P h i l i p Sidney's Apologie f o r Poetrie: 
"There i s no Arte delivered to mankinde that hath 
not the workes of Nature f o r his p r i n c i p a l l 
object., without which they could not consist, 
and on which they so depend as they have become 
Actors and Players, as i t were, of what Nature 
w i l l have set foorth...Onely the Poet,disdayning 
to be t i e d to any such subjection, l i f t e d up 
w i t h the vigor of his owne invention,doeth 
growe, i n e f f e c t , another nature, i n making 
things either better than Nature bringeth f o o r t h , 
or quite a newe formes such as never were i n 
Nature, as the Heroes, Demi-gods, Cyclops, 
Chimeras, Furies, and such l i k e : so as hee goeth 
hand i n hand w i t h Nature, not inclosed w i t h i n 
(1) Painting and Reality p.117 
(42) 
the narrow warrant of her g u i f t s , but f r e e l y 
ranging onely w i t h i n the Zodiack of his owne 
w i t . " (1) 
(Also relevant i n the context of the c r e a t i v i t y of the 
a r t i s t is. the Romantic theory of ar t based upon the 
Imagination, which i s described i n much Romantic c r i t i c i s m 
as the synthesizing and creative f a c u l t y , ) The idea of 
c r e a t i v i t y , associated as i t i s with ideas of God and 
freedom, i s at most times a strong j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a r t , 
although there have been times when i t would be regarded as 
suspect, as an unlawful attempt by man to r i v a l the 
c r e a t i v i t y of God. 
But i f the t r a d i t i o n a l a n t i t h e s i s between the a r t i s t 
and the s c i e n t i s t i s accepted, we do seem to be compelled 
to draw a s i m i l a r d i s t i n c t i o n between the a r t i s t and the 
r e a l i s t . For realism, the attempt to reproduce things just 
as they are, seems to have much more i n common wi t h the 
cognitive and s c i e n t i f i c than with the creative and a r t i s t i c 
Gilson makes t h i s point very emphatically: 
"Hence an antinomy w i t h i n the very notion of 
i m i t a t i o n a l a r t . I f i t i s an a r t , painting must 
add something to i t s i m i t a t i o n of r e a l i t y . I n 
other words, i t must create. Now creation i s 
the very reverse of i m i t a t i o n . " (2) 
and again: 
" I m i t a t i o n . - that i s , the representation of 
r e a l i t y as i t appears to be - stands on the 
(1) An Apologie f o r Poetrie p.7 
(g^Paintiai^ and Reality p.250 
(43) 
side of science, or,, to use a more modest word,, 
knowledge." ( l ) 
I t i s not only the opponents of realism who i d e n t i f y i t 
w i t h science. Realists themselves tend to be p a r t i c u l a r l y 
proud of t j ^ e i r s c i e n t i f i c approach. Uccello i s an obvious 
example of a Renaissance painter preoccupied with the 
s c i e n t i f i c a p p l i c a t i o n of the laws of perspective. Zola i s 
notorious f o r his "Naturalism": his attempt to apply the 
methods of a p o s i t i v i s t i c science to l i t e r a t u r e . I n the 
preface to La Fortune des Rougon, he describes the series 
of novels of which that book forms a part, as: 
"The Natural and Social History of a Family 
under t^e Second Empire." (2) 
Even such a r e l a t i v e l y uneccentric f i g u r e as Constable i s 
quoted by Gombrich. as saying: 
"Painting i s a science, and should be pursued as 
an i n q u i r y i n t o the laws of nature. Why, then, 
may not landscape painting be considered as a-
branch of natural philosophy, of which the 
pictures are but the experiments?" (3) 
Some d i s t i n c t i o n between a r t and science i s needed i f 
a r t i s to be considered as having a function and value of 
i t s own.The idea that a r t i s creative both provides the 
d i s t i n c t i o n and goes some way to explaining the value. 
C r e a t i v i t y thus becomes one of the accepted hall-marks of 
a r t ; and insofar as realism can be seen as abandoning the 
(1) Painting and Reality p.285 
(2) DMLR p.116 
(3) quoted by Gombrich: Art and I l l u s i o n p, 29 
(44) 
s p e c i f i c a l l y a r t i s t i c i d e a l of creation, and a l i g n i n g i t s e l f 
w i t h some branch of science, there i s a very strong case 
f o r maintaining that realism i s not a r t . 
The second main, way i n which a r t i s distinguished and 
defined i s i n r e l a t i o n t o the work of art i t s e l f , , rather 
than the a c t i v i t y of the a r t i s t . I t helps us to j u s t i f y 
the phenomenon of a r t , i f we can show that a work of a r t 
has some q u a l i t y which sets i t apart from objects and 
events i n the non-aesthetic sphere; or that i t performs some 
valuable fu n c t i o n which they cannot perform. 
Gilson.'s Aristotelian'influences enable him to connect 
very closely the ideas of c r e a t i v i t y and form: the a r t i s t 
creates by imposing a form upon his material. The formal 
element thus becomes the most important distinguishing 
q u a l i t y of the work of a r t , to which the other elements are 
to be subordinated. 
I n the past, the char a c t e r i s t i c which a work of art 
was supposed to possess.rY/as:.desc.ribed simply as "beauty". 
Recent attempts to give a. more informative description 
tend t o centre around the idea of form (variously 
interpreted) and related concepts such as unity and 
s t r u c t u r e . Harold Osborne ta l k s of "organic u n i t y " ( l ) ; 
Eric G i l l of " o r i g i n a l form" ( 2 ) ; and Clive B e l l of 
" s i g n i f i c a n t f o m " ( 3 ) . For a l l of them, a work i s a 
genuine work of a r t i f , and only i f , i t possesses t h i s 
q u a l i t y of form, however interpreted. 
(1) Aesthetics and Art Theory chap. 10 
(2>Essay i n Aid ofaa Grammar of Practical Aesthetics' 
(Painting and Reality:appendix 4) 
(3) A r i 
(45) 
A preoccupation w i t h the v i s u a l arts can lead to an 
over-emphasis on the ideas of beauty and form as the basic 
aesthetic ingredients. Definitions of a r t with a more 
l i t e r a r y o r i e n t a t i o n tend to give more prominence to the 
fun c t i o n of the work of a r t . They attempt to define the work 
of a r t by means of some s p e c i f i c a l l y aesthetic function; 
whether a p a r t i c u l a r blend of.delight and i n s t r u c t i o n , or 
the expression or communication of f e e l i n g and emotion. 
But a l l these d e f i n i t i o n s of a r t agree that the true 
work of a r t , even i f representational, gives us something 
which we do not f i n d i n the r e a l i t y i t represents. The work 
of a r t i s not just a copy of, or a substitute f o r , the 
things and q u a l i t i e s we f i n d i n r e a l l i f e . And t h i s amounts 
'to saying that whatever a r t i s , i t i s never realism; f o r 
realism, as such, i s nothing other than the reproduction of 
r e a l i t y . Thus, although realism may be, and frequently i s , 
found i n conjunction w i t h a q u a l i t y or fimc t i o n which i s 
genuinely aesthetic, realism i t s e l f i s not an aesthetic 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . And the conclusion that realism i s not ar t 
i s duly deduced from the various d e f i n i t i o n s of art outlined 
above. Gilson's own conclusions are th a t : 
"Representational or not, a painting i s a true 
work of a r t to the extent that i t abstracts 
from a l l the elements that are not compatible 
w i t h , or required f o r , the embodiment i n matter 
of the germinal form, conceived by the painter."(1) 
"His s t a r t i n g - p o i n t i s fantasy, imagination, 
(1) Painting and Reality p,258 
(46) 
f i c t i o n , and a l l the elements of r e a l i t y that do 
not agree with the creature imagined by the 
painter have to be ru t h l e s s l y eliminated. In 
t h i s sense, realism should be described as the 
antipodes of a r t . " (1) 
Joshua Reynolds c r i t i c i z e s realism from the standpoint of 
one who considers that the be a u t i f j i l , which he equates 
v^ith the imiversal norm of a species, i s the essence of a r t . 
The imitative painter: 
"must, by regarding minute p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s , 
and accidental discriminations, deviate from 
the xmiversal rule and pollute h i s canvas with 
deformity." (2) 
Olive B e l l , on the basis of his theory of s i g n i f i c a n t form, 
claims that: 
"Formal significance loses i t s e l f i n 
preoccupation with exact representation and 
ostentatious cunning." (3) 
and that: 
" I f a representative form has value, i t i s as 
form, not as representation." (4) 
Sidney, who puts forward the delight-and-instruction 
theory of a r t , says that the a r t i s t has the advantage over 
the h i s t o r i a n ( and, by implication, the r e a l i s t ) that he 
can a l t e r h i s material f or the maxim\«n didactic e f f e c t : 
(1) •• Painting and R e a l i t y p.130 
(2) L e t t e r to The I d l e r ; Nov. 10th 1759 (Painting and 
Reality appendix 1) 
(3) Art p.23 (4) Art p.25 
(•47) 
"For indeede Poetrie ever setteth vertue so out 
i n her best cullours, making Fortune her w e l l -
wayting hand-raayd, that one must needs be 
enamored of her...But the Historian, being 
captived to the trueth of a f o o l i s h world, i s 
many times a t e r r o r from well dooing, and an 
incouragement to unbridled wickednes." ( l ) 
And Tolstoy, on the basis of his theory that art i s the 
communication.' of fe e l i n g , c r i t i c i z e s the pseudo-art of 
imita t i v e and r e a l i s t writers.; 
"The attention of the receiver of the a r t i s t i c 
impression i s diverted by a l l these well-
observed details,; and they hinder the 
communication of f e e l i n g even when the fe e l i n g 
e x i s t s . " (2) 
Thus there i s almost universal agreement that the a r t i s t i c 
value of any work of art does not l i e i n the f a i t h f u l and 
l i t e r a l reproduction of r e a l i t y ; rather, i t l i e s i n the 
s i g n i f i c a n t d i s t o r t i o n s of that reproduction, which make 
the representation, i f there i s one, conform to some 
higher c r i t e r i o n of a r t , such as beauty, form, 
communication: and so on.Yet i t i s the undistorted 
r e f l e c t i o n of l i f e which i s the idea l of realism: and 
realism again seems to be not only d i s t i n c t from, but also 
i n many ways contrary to a r t . Again the argument against 
realism i s reinforced by the way i n which the r e a l i s t t a l k s 
about h i s own work. Not the model of the s c i e n t i s t t h i s 
(1) Apologie for Poetrie p.22 
(2) What i s Art? p.187 
(48) 
time,; but the recurring image of the mirror, with i t s 
implications of l i t e r a l and unselective reflection: of the 
world, exposes the difference between realism and those 
q u a l i t i e s which we claim to value most highly i n a r t . 
One corolMry of the b e l i e f that art gives us something 
other than a copy of the r e a l v^orld, i s that our reactions 
to art ought not to be the same as our reactions to r e a l 
things. Prom t h i s , a whole doctrine of "the aesthetic 
response" develops; a doctrine which has at l e a s t an 
i n d i r e c t bearing upon realism, insofar as a r e a l i s t i c 
approach to art i n general i s assumed to encourage people 
to go to art. looking for the emotions and interests of 
l i f e . A r e a l i s t i c work of a r t , too,does nothing to further 
a. s p e c i f i c a l l y aesthetic response, which i n some extreme 
cases seems to become not just a necessary condition of 
aesthetic experience, but the basic c r i t e r i o n of art 
i t s e l f . 
One of the most usual analyses of the aesthetic 
response i s that i t i s a purely contemplative one, 
concentrating upon the q u a l i t i e s of the work of art i t s e l f , 
and not disturbed by the moral attitudes and p r a c t i c a l 
concerns which we f e e l for the objects and events of r e a l 
l i f e . . Nor shoiild we expect the work of art to perform some 
further p r a c t i c a l or moral function. This sort of 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s put forward by Gilson: 
" I f he considers a painting as a means to any 
other end than i t s contemplation, a man does 
(49) 
not see i t as a work of a r t . " (1) 
The main recent formulation of t h i s kind of theory i s to 
be found i n Bullough*s doctrine of psychical distance. 
Bullough t a l k s about t h i s concept with reference to the 
experience of a fog at sea: 
"Tn the fog, the transformation by distance i s 
produced, i n the f i r s t instance, by putting 
the phenomenon, so to speak, out of gear with 
our p r a c t i c a l , actual s e l f : by allowing i t to 
stand outside the context of our personal needs 
and ends - i n short, by looking at i t 
'objectively' as i t has often been called, by 
permitting only such reactions on our part as 
emphasise the 'objective' features of the 
experience, and by interpreting even our 
"subjective' affections.,., not as modes of our 
being but rather as c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the 
phenomenon." (2) 
Bullough himself does not consider distance to be the 
essence of a r t . He sees i t , rather, as a necessary 
condition of an appropriate response on the part of the 
percipient. For him, then, distance does not become a 
fundamental and overriding aesthetic c r i t e r i o n . His ideal 
i s the minimum of distance without i t s complete disappear-
ance, which i s compatible with realism, for realism, 
whilst i t does not encourage distancing, does not 
(1) Painting and Reality p.118 
(2) 'Psychical Distance': Aesthetics p.95 
(50) 
eliminate the element of distance altogether. But he s t i l l 
f e e l s that a r t i s b a s i c a l l y n o n - r e a l i s t i c ; and t h i s 
p o s i t i o n i s c a r r i e d to i t s l o g i c a l conclusion by Ortega y 
Gasset, i n The Dehumanization of Art, where he argues 
that the purest and most a r t i s t i c a r t , at l e a s t i n the 
v i s u a l sphere, i s an a r t which i s "dehumanized", purified 
from i t s associations with ordinary,"lived" reality.And 
t h i s he equates with the tendency towards abstract and 
u n r e a l i s t i c a r t . Thus even from the point of view of the 
response to a r t , realism can be held to be u n a r t i s t i c . 
There i s a very different t r a d i t i o n , however, which 
sees the aesthetic response as one which i s characterized, 
not by disinterestedness and distance, but by emotional 
i n t e n s i t y . A r i s t o t l e ' s controversial doctrine of 'catharsis' 
can be interpreted i n t h i s way, and i t i s c e r t a i n l y not 
unusual to r e f e r to the experience of art as one which i s 
profoimdly emotional. Of a l l the aesthetic arguments and 
theories, t h i s one i s the most compatible with realism. For 
i n t e r e s t , involvement and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n would a l l seem to 
be important ingredients of an intense emotional response, 
and these realism could help to provide. But although a 
degree of realism might even be necessary i n t h i s context, 
the c r i t e r i o n of i n t e n s i t y , no l e s s than the c r i t e r i o n of 
distance, seems to defeand at l e a s t the transcendence of 
realism. For i f emotional i n t e n s i t y i s to be what makes us 
value a r t , then i t w i l l tend to be described as an i n t e n s i t y 
greater than, or at l e a s t of a different quality from, that 
found in! the norm of experience which i s the domain of 
(51) 
realism. The storm scenes i n King Lear, for instance, are 
t y p i c a l examples of the kind of thing which we would c a l l 
" i n t e n s i t y " , but we would hardly c a l l them realism. Thus 
even i n t e n s i t y , although i t may often be supported by 
realism, i s not n e c e s s a r i l y r e a l i s t i c , and does not help 
to ascribe any a r t i s t i c value to realism i n i t s e l f . 
III.Attempts to defend realism 
The case against realism looks even stronger when we 
look at some of the ways i n which the r e a l i s t t r i e s to 
defend h i s art from the charges brought against i t . Even 
i f he does not go so f a r as to assert a mimetic theory, 
which would make realism the basic aesthetic quality, the 
more modest claim that realism can embody those q u a l i t i e s 
which are f e l t to be genuinely a r t i s t i c , i s stiibl beset by 
objections. For the r e a l i s t ' s defence of his work only 
succeeds i n reco n c i l i n g art and realism by compromising 
ei t h e r the theory of realism, or the theory of art to 
which i t i s opposed. 
By f a r the most common, defence of realism i s the 
argument that realism i t s e l f i s something more than just 
the reduplication of l i f e . I t i s the reproduction of l i f e 
beautified, organized, i n t e n s i f i e d , or i n some other way 
modified, so that realism i s no longer l i a b l e to the kind 
of objections t r a d i t i o n a l l y brought against i t . Q u a l i f i c a -
tions such as t h i s are found again and again throughout 
r e a l i s t c r i t i c i s m : 
"There i s no true depiction without colour. 
(52) 
v i t a l s p i r i t , l i f e and animation, without 
features and fe e l i n g . I t would therefore be 
stupid to apply the preceding d e f i n i t i o n to 
mechanical a r t : v i t a l s p i r i t i s depicted only 
by v i t a l s p i r i t , whence i t follows that for 
many men of l e t t e r s i t would be impossible to 
depict a l i v e man." (1) 
But a l l that such modifications of the r e a l i s t theory do, i s 
to subordinate, i m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y , realism i t s e l f , 
to some other, l e s s objectionably aesthetic quality. And 
when t h i s step i s taken, the way i s l e f t open for i t to be 
taken to i t s l o g i c a l conclusion, which i s the separation 
of a r t and realism, and the assertion that realism, as 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y understood, i s not a r t (although the l a b e l 
' r e a l i s t i c ' may be retained to denote something very 
d i f f e r e n t . ) 
A s l i g h t v a r i a t i o n of t h i s kind of argument i s based 
on the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of absolute realism. Even the r e a l i s t 
w i l l always modify and interpret h i s material, so that i t 
becomes something "more" than simple reproduction. Thus 
Hamlin Garland argues that: 
" I t w i l l never be ipere reproduction so long as 
the a r t i s t represents i t as he sees i t . The 
f a c t w i l l correct the fantasy. The a r t i s t w i l l 
colour the f a c t . " (2) 
But to defend something on the grounds that i t can never 
quite be achieved i s hardly an adequate j u s t i f i c a t i o n , and 
(1) P. Desnoyers:'On Realism' JMLR p.81 
(2) Grumbling Idols p.63 
(53) 
i s another example of an apparent r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of art 
and realism which, i n f a c t , implies at l e a s t a p a r t i a l 
r e j e c t i o n of realism. 
There are, on the other hand, a number of apparently 
plausible arguments to the effect that realism i n i t s 
unqualified form can be beautiful, creative and so on. But 
a c l o s e r analysis of these arguments reveals that they 
only work when the "aesthetic" q u a l i t i e s have been 
reformulated to such an exteiit that they can no longer 
provide the distinguishing and j u s t i f i c a t o r y c r i t e r i a of 
ar t which they were o r i g i n a l l y meant to furnish. Thus, 
v/hen Zola writes i n The Experimental Hovel: 
"Thus instead of binding the novelist t i g h t l y , 
the experimental method leaves him a l l h i s 
i n t e l l i g e n c e as thinker and a l l his genius as 
creator. He must see., understand, invent." ( l ) 
he i s using the idea of creation i n a way so modified that 
i t can no longer be the basis of a d e f i n i t i o n of art which 
distinguishes i t from other things and explains i t s 
p a r t i c u l a r value. Neither can Raymond Williams' denial of 
the creation/perception d i s t i n c t i o n : 
"Reality as we experience i t i s a human creation." 
(2) 
help us to equate realism and a r t , but only indicates that 
the difference between them might be a difference of degree 
rather than kind. I n the sense i n which a l l experience can 
(1) DMLR p.169 
(2) The Long Revolution p.18 
(54) 
be s a i d to be creative, c r e a t i v i t y cannot be used as the 
defining c r i t e r i o n of a r t . 
Much the same objection can be made to the type of 
argument which sees no discontinuity between realism and 
beauty, because i t claims that the beautiful i n art i s the 
reproduction of the beautiful i n nature. For t h i s leaves 
no room for the concept of a s p e c i f i c a l l y valuable a r t i s t i c 
beauty, and makes art very d e f i n i t e l y a substitute for, 
and subordinate to, l i f e . A simple "beauty i s truth; truth 
beauty" point of view, on the other hand, as expressed by 
Dreiser, i s l i t t l e more than rhetoric and has no force as 
a serious argiunent: 
"a true picture of l i f e , honestly and 
r e v e r e n t i a l l y set down, i s both moral and 
a r t i s t i c . " ( l ) 
Likewise a documentary function of art,which would tend to 
support realism, f a i l s to furnish the required d i s t i n c t i o n 
between art and other a c t i v i t i e s , such as science and 
hi s t o r y : 
"We have had the figures, the dates, the bare 
history, the dime-novel statement of pioneer 
l i f e , but how few r e a l novels I How few 
accurate studies of speech and l i f e I There i t 
l i e s , ready to be put into the novel and the 
drama, and upon canvas." (2) 
Such a d i s t i n c t i o n i s what i s provided by theories which 
replace the communication or expression of f a c t s , by the 
(1)'True Art Speaks P I a i i a y / DMiR p. 156 
(2) Crumbling Idols p.16 
(55) 
communication or expression of feelings as the function of 
a r t . 
I t i s perfectly f e a s i b l e to claim that realism i s not 
incompatible with that psychical distance which i s often 
put forward as a necessary condition of the aesthetic 
response. Any work of art which we recognize as such w i l l 
be the object of a distanced response: or, i f i t i s not, 
the f a i l u r e to distance i s more l i k e l y to be, as Bullough 
himself points out, a re s u l t of subject-matter, rather 
than of realism i t s e l f : 
" e x p l i c i t references to organic affections, to 
the material existence of the body, especially 
to sexual matters, l i e normally below the 
distance-limi't, and can be touched upon by art 
only with s p e c i a l precautions. Allusions to 
s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of any degree of personal 
importance - i n p a r t i c u l a r allusions implying 
any doubt as to t h e i r v a l i d i t y - the 
questioning of some generally-recognized ethical, 
sanctions, references to topical subjects 
occupying public attention at the moment, and 
any such l i k e are a l l dangerously near the 
average l i m i t and may at any time f a l l below 
i t , arousing, instead of aesthetic appreciation, 
concrete h o s t i l i t y or mere amusement." (1) 
But i f distance i s used as the c r i t e r i o n of good art (as i t 
i s by Ortega y Gasset) then the degree of distancing which 
(1)'Psychical Distance' :Aesthetics p. 102 
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realism arouses i s no longer s u f f i c i e n t to c l a s s i f y i t as 
a r t , but leaves i t on the side of the " l i v e d " r e a l i t y of 
ordinary experience, as opposed to the "observed" r e a l i t y 
of the t r u l y a r t i s t i c . Even on some sort of catharsis 
theory, i t i s possible, though l e s s easy, to object to a 
defence of realism on aesthetic grounds. For i f the 
emotional experience of art i s meant to be used as an 
aesthetic c r i t e r i o n , i t w i l l be distinguished as an 
experience of a quality which we cannot derive from l i f e 
or from a history book. Thus realism, although doubtless 
stimulating the emotions, may s t i l l not give r i s e to 
experiences of the concentration, richness or completeness 
which can be postulated as c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the 
genuinely aesthetic experience. 
Thus,if we once accept that q u a l i t i e s such as beauty, 
c r e a t i v i t y , expressiveness and so on, are the t y p i c a l 
kinds of aesthetic q u a l i t i e s , i t becomes very d i f f i c u l t to 
reconcile realism with a r t . Neither can we claim that 
realism has some p a r t i c u l a r aesthetic value of i t s ovm; for 
the mimetic theory of art i s not only untenable i n i t s e l f , 
but also c o n f l i c t s , to a greater or l e s s e r degree, with a l l 
the more acceptable theories. Thus we are led to the 
conclusion that realism i s not a r t . 
From t h i s i n i t i a l conclusion, however, two different 
positions with regard to the status of realism i n art are 
deduced. Some maintain that realism and art are completely 
opposed, and that realism i s hostilje to a r t . Others say 
merely that realism i s irrelevant to a r t i s t i c value. Each 
(57) 
of these positions i s consistent with the conclusion that 
realism i s not a r t , and which of them we decide to adopt 
depends on whether we think that art ought to be being 
a r t i s t i c a l l the time, or whether we think that i t should 
just embody aesthetic q u a l i t i e s i n some way. From the point 
of view of the aesthetic argument, a l l that i t i s necessary 
to shov; i s that realism i s not a r t ; and t h i s , I think, 
the argument succeeds i n doing. 
One further point which should be made i s that, although 
realism can be seen as the ultimate i n representation, the 
aesthetic argument i s only r e a l l y compelling when applied 
to realism: that i s , to f a i t h f u l representation rather 
than to representation i n general. Most of the theories of 
art suggest that some modification of representation i s 
necessary, but t h i s i s a very different thing from saying 
that representation i t s e l f should ^e excluded from a r t . I n 
any case, a non-representational narrative, for instance, i s 
a contradiction i n terms, and there are many considerations 
such as significance and comprehension, which can be used 
to defend representation, although not that extreme of 
representation which i s realism. The advocates of pure a r t , 
meaning non-representational a r t , i n painting, one of whom 
i s Gilson, seem to be taking the aesthetic argument to an 
unnecessary, and i n many ways,an unacceptable extreme.. 
(58) 
Chapter 3: The J u s t i f i c a t i o n of Realism 
There i s , then, a strong case for saying tjaat realism 
i s not the quality whifch i d e n t i f i e s and distinguishes a 
work of a r t ; and that the d i s t i n c t i v e l y aesthetic q u a l i t i e s 
are only achieved by s a c r i f i c i n g realism to a greater or 
l e s s e r degree, and v i c e versa. 
But the conclusions which are drawn from the aesthetic 
argument, to the effect that realism i s at best a worthless 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , and ought to be discouraged i n a r t , seem to 
r e s t upon a confusion of two different meanings of " a r t " . 
"Art", i n the sense i n which realism has been shown to be 
"not a r t " , i s the defining c r i t e r i o n of a work of a r t , the 
quali t y which sets i t apart from other things. But when we 
t r y to assess the value of realism i n a r t , we are now 
t a l k i n g about " a r t " as an i n s t i t u t i o n , the sum t o t a l of a l l 
works of a r t , considered from every relevant angle. The 
two meanings of " a r t " are quite d i s t i n c t ; and to show that 
realism i s not art i n the f i r s t sense i s by no means to show 
that i t i s of no value to art i n the second. The theory that 
the only q u a l i t i e s which are important to art as a whole, 
are those which define i t , i s one particizlar theory of a r t , 
which w i l l have to be considered l a t e r . At the moment, I 
s h a l l simply t r y to show some of the ways i n which realism, 
although not a s p e c i f i c a l l y aesthetic property, can make a 
s i g n i f i c a n t and valuable contribution to art i n the general 
sense. These considerations, although, strictly-speaking, 
they are neither aesthetic nor moral arguments, form a 
use f i i l bridge between the two, i n that they help to reveal 
(59) 
some of the l i m i t a t i o n s of the aesthetic argument, and the 
kind of way i n which realism can be defended, which , i n 
turn, leads into that more emphatic defence of realism, the 
moral argument. 
The aesthetic argument, as we have already seen, shows 
that realism cannot be pure a r t , or even to be compatible 
with pure a r t , however pure art may be defined ( t h i s need 
not always be i n a f o r m a l i s t i c way, although the phrase 
"pure a r t " has associations of formalism). But a strong 
defence of realism can be b u i l t on the grounds that impure 
art i s i n many ways of more importance than the pure variety. 
Realism i s best considered as a valuable aesthetic impurity; 
and t h i s , i n c i d e n t a l l y , helps to show why the discrediting 
of the mimetic theory i s hardly relevant to the importance 
of realism i n a r t . 
I . Technical and Cognitive Values of Realism 
The technical s k i l l v;hich i s involved i n the creation 
of a r e a l i s t i c representation, and the information and 
in s i g h t s about some aspect of l i f e which are conveyed by i t , 
are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which provide important reasons for our 
undeniable admiration for realism. Technical s k i l l i s a 
quality which we appreciate i n painting, rather than 
l i t e r a t u r e ; and the importance of cognition seems greater i n 
l i t e r a t u r e than i n painting: but t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s no more 
an absolute one than was the d i s t i n c t i o n between direct and 
in d i r e c t representation. 
I n painting, then, a large part of our respect for 
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realism i s based upon the appreciation of the sheer manual 
and tec h n i c a l v i r t u o s i t y of the painter. We are fascinated 
to see how he has managed to produce such an impressive 
l i k e n e s s of the r e a l thing i n the medium of paint and 
canvas. I n The Tmths of F i c t i o n . Alan Rodway t r i e s to apply 
the same idea to l i t e r a t u r e , and, incidentally, suggests 
that v i r t u o s i t y i n handling the medium could be a source of 
aesthetic appreciation. His analysis of the a r t i s t ' s s k i l l 
would be even better f i t t e d to t h i s aspect of realism i n the 
di r e c t representation of v i s u a l a r t : 
"But i f the degree of verbal s k i l l i n attaining 
an i l l u s i o n of r e a l i t y i s s u f f i c i e n t l y high, we 
can get an aesthetic pleasure even from realism: 
not from the r e a l i t i e s of the content, but from 
the superb handling of the language...putting 
what i s eminently more than verbal into nothing 
more than words, but doing i t better than the 
reader could." ( l ) 
The importance which we attach to technical s k i l l should not 
be underestimated. I t i s something which we admire, although 
our admiration i s limited, even when the context i n which 
i t i s exercised i s a t r i v i a l or even an immoral one: we 
have a degree of admiration, for the juggler and for the 
master-criminal. And, i n a r t , realism i s the natural and 
legitimate exploitation of some of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s which 
representational art y i e l d s for the development and display 
of s k i l l and v i r t u o s i t y . We should regard realism ,therefore, 
(1) The Truths of F i c t i o n p.165 
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with the respect with which we regard such accomplishment 
i n any other sphere. There are, of course, many other ways 
i n which the a r t i s t ' s s k i l l i s exerted i n his a r t , but 
realism does bring with i t the additional advantage of 
having a defi n i t e c r i t e r i o n of success. We know, more or 
l e s s , what r e a l things look l i k e , and, assuming that the 
a r t i s t i s tr y i n g to produce a r e a l i s t i c representation, we 
can t e l l , with some accuracy, to what extent he has 
succeeded. With other kinds of a r t , i t i s more d i f f i c u l t to 
estimate the s k i l l of the a r t i s t , because we usually have 
no way of knowing what he was trying to do, apart from what 
he has a c t u a l l y done. This advantage of realism i s i n some 
ways dangerous, since i t makes realism a c r i t e r i o n which 
can be applied too e a s i l y , and misguidedly used to assess 
the... achievement of a r t i s t s who were not even trying to 
produce a r e a l i s t i c representation. 
But our admiration for s k i l l , although genuine and 
v a l i d , i s also limited. And we frequently f e e l , for instance 
with some purely i l l u s i o n i s t a r t , that the cleverness shown 
by the a r t i s t i s not of s u f f i c i e n t importance to j u s t i f y 
the s a c r i f i c e or more aesthetic q u a l i t i e s . A stronger 
reason for our regard for realism i s i t s cognitive value. 
A r e a l i s t i c representation can have cognitive value i n two 
ways. I t can extend our experience by giving us an insight 
into the conditions, and an understanding of the problems 
which are to be found i n areas of l i f e of which we have no 
immediate experience. As well as t h i s , a r e a l i s t i c work of 
art can often s t r i k e us as a discovery of some previously 
(62) 
unnoticed aspect of f a m i l i a r experiences. The representations 
of a r t do seem to influence the sort of things of which we 
are aware, although i t would be rash to speculate on the 
extent of t h i s influence. The a r t i s t who recognizes and 
depicts something which has previously been neglected by a r t , 
Can i n some ways be seen as helping us to discover 
something new about the world. 
Art which i n e i t h e r way carries forward t h i s process 
of exploration of experience i s very highly respected, and 
respected f o r precisely these cognitive q u a l i t i e s , A great 
deal of the current esteem f o r the work of Solzhenitsyn, 
f o r example, seems to me to be based, not so much on 
aesthetic c r i t e r i a , i n the narrow sense (although t h i s i s 
not to deny that his work has aesthetic merit) as on i t s 
documentary significance and force. And t h i s i s a perfec t l y 
l e g i t i m a t e and v a l i d reason f o r admiring any work of a r t , 
although I do not see how we could say t h i s i f we accepted 
th a t realism was of no value i n a r t . The approach from the 
aesthetic argument tends to see i n the cognitive function 
of realism a deviation from the true ends and ideals of a r t . 
But there are others vjho have seen i t as a valuable 
c o n t r i b u t i o n to a r t , giv i n g i t a seriousness, value and 
significance which i t would othervfise lack. Zola, f o r 
instance, r i d i c u l e s purely aesthetic , or at least 
f o r m a l i s t i c , c r i t i c i s m , thus: 
"What a p r e t t y piece of mechanism i t i s I And 
one piece i s b e a u t i f u l l y adjusted to mesh with 
another piece, which i n t u r n sets the whole 
mechanism i n motion! The c r i t i c preens himself; 
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he cannot f i n d words s u f f i c i e n t l y f u l l of 
praise to express the pleasure he gets from t h i s 
gadget.Wouldn't you thi n k he was t a l k i n g about 
a toy, a puzzle, which he i s proud of scrambling 
and p u t t i n g together again? As f o r me, I am 
unmoved by Le F i l s Naturel. Why i s that? Am I 
more stupid than the c r i t i c ? I do not think so. 
Only, I have no taste f o r clockwork, and I am 
very fond of t r u t h . Yes, to be sure, i t i s a 
p r e t t y mechanism. But I should l i k e i t to be 
glorious w i t h l i f e , I should l i k e l i f e , w i t h 
i t s t h r i l l , i t s amplitude, i t s power. I should 
l i k e a l l of l i f e . " ( l ) 
and another r e a l i s t w r i t e r says: 
" I consider i t of the utmost importance that the 
novel has ceased to be a work of mere 
entertainment, a means of passing a few hours 
pleasantly, and has been raised to the l e v e l of 
s o c i a l , psychological, h i s t o r i c a l analysis - i n 
short, a study." (2) 
One consequence of the cognitive value of realism, which 
ought to be mentioned at t h i s point i s that the discoveries 
of a r t do not have the same value when repeated as they do 
when they are f i r s t made. This i s of less importance i n 
l i t e r a t u r e , where the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of making new discoveries 
and conveying new information about l i f e seem to be i n f i n i t e . 
But i t might help to explain why Vasari could, quite 
(1) 'Naturalism i n the Theatre' DMLR p.229 
(2) Emilia Pardo Bazan: Preface; Un via.le de novios;DMLl p263 
(6.4) 
l e g i t i m a t e l y wax l y r i c a l about aspects of Renaissance 
p a i n t i n g which were then major discoveries about the 
appearances of things, but which are now disregarded as the 
common property of every hack a r t i s t . I t i s misleading to 
represent our lack of in t e r e s t i n perspective and so on as 
a sign that we have advanced beyond the naive r e a l i s t i c 
p r i n c i p l e s of Vasari. I t shows, rather, that the value of a 
discovery i s e s s e n t i a l l y a h i s t o r i c a l value, and cannot be 
repeated. 
I I . Realism and the Representational Tradition i n Art 
So f a r , we have been looking at tfee contributions which 
realism can make to a r t , i f not exactly i n vacuo, then at 
least not i n the context of the whole t r a d i t i o n of 
representational a r t . And yet to look at realism out of t h i s 
context i s to neglect some of the most important 
considerations i n i t s favour. 
The aesthetic arguments against realism are reinforced 
by an insistence upon the "passivity", the " s t e r i l i t y " 
and the "mechanical'' character of copying l i f e i n a r t . This 
sounds true as long as we think only of what the a r t i s t i s 
doing t o the r e a l i t y which he i s copying. I f he i s a r e a l i s t , 
he i s not a l t e r i n g i t i n any way - or at least he i s t r y i n g 
not t o . But t h i s approach plays down the fact that what i s 
given to the a r t i s t i s not only l i f e , but also a t r a d i t i o n 
of a r t i n which l i f e i s represented and reproduced i n 
d i f f e r e n t ways and f o r d i f f e r e n t purposes. Much of the 
importance of realism l i e s , not' i n the way i n which i t 
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modifies, or rather f a i l s t o modify, l i f e , but the way i n 
which i t modifies and develops the representation of l i f e 
i n a r t . 
Realists themselves c r i t i c i z e i m i t a t i v e a r t . But by 
t h i s , they do not mean a r t which copies nature, but a r t 
which s l a v i s h l y adheres t o the conventions and t r a d i t i o n s 
of the a r t of the past, and thus becomes l i f e l e s s and 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t . I n r e l a t i o n to a r t of t h i s kind, realism, 
f o r a l l that i t t r i e s j u s t to copy r e a l i t y , i s anything but 
passive and s e r v i l e . Realism i n a r t i s better characterized 
as something v i t a l , and even revolutionary; and i t has 
frequently been hailed as, a fresh and l i f e - g i v i n g force i n 
an otherwise false and s t e r i l e a r t i s t i c t r a d i t i o n : 
"At l a s t Realism i s coming!' 
I t i s through t h i s underbrush, t h i s b a t t l e of 
the Cimbri, t h i s Pandemonium, of Greek temples, 
lyres and jews harps, of alhambras and s i c k l y 
oaks, of boleros, of s i l l y sonnets, of golden 
odes, of rusty daggers, rapiers and weekly 
columns, of hamadryads i n the moonlight and the 
tenderness of Venus, of marriages i n the manner 
of M. Scribe, of w i t t y caricatures and 
unretouched photographs, of canes and false 
c o l l a r s , of toothless discussions and c r i t i c i s m s , 
of t o t t e r y t r a d i t i o n s of i l l - f i t t i n g customs 
addressed t o the public, that Bealism has made 
a breach." (1) 
(1) P.Desnoyers: 'On Realism' DIVILR p..87 
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" I t would be d i f f i c u l t , I t h i n k , f o r any one 
but a r e a l i s t novelist to overrate the good that 
realism i n f i c t i o n has done. I t has cleared the 
a i r of a thousand f o l l i e s , has pricked a whole 
f l e e t of o r a t o r i c a l bubbles." ( l ) 
Realism, then, i s not ju s t something simple, passive and 
boring. The f a i t h f u l representation of r e a l i t y involves the 
recognition and elimination of those elements of 
misrepresentation which have become embodied i n a r t , and 
are known as "conventions". 
I n one sense, the sense i n which a convention i s a 
necessary difference between art and l i f e , conventions and 
realism cannot be h o s t i l e to one another. I t i s only by 
accepting such conventions that we can say that a work of 
a r t i s r e a l i s t i c at a l l . But another kind of convention i s 
th a t t r a d i t i o n a l difference between l i f e and a r t which i s 
not necessary, but which has become so well-established 
that i t i s no longer questioned, and perhaps not even 
recognized as a conventional element. And i t i s towards 
t h i s kind of convention that realism i s h o s t i l e . One such 
convention, and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h realism, i s dealt: 
w i t h by Auerbach, i n his book Mimesis. Among other things, 
Auerbach traces the tendency f o r realism i n l i t e r a t u r e to 
move away from the conventional separation of high and low 
s t y l e s , towards a portrayal of ordinary l i f e i n which the 
serious and the problematic are adequately expressed. 
Conventions are to be found, not only i n the manner of 
representation, but also i n the selection of the subjects 
represented. I t i s a common characteristic of realism to 
(1) EdraiHid Gosse: 'The Limits of Realism i n F i c t i o n ' DMLR p392 
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break away from the t r a d i t i o n a l and "poetic" subjects 
and to represent the contemporary scene, and aspects of 
l i f e which are usually disregarded by a r t . The r e a l i s t 
attempts, not ju s t t o copy l i f e , but also to recognize and 
correct those perhaps unnoticed misrepresentations which 
we have come to accept i n a r t . For the r e a l i s t , t h i s 
corrective aspect of his a r t i s often the most important; 
and many sympathetic discussions of realism emphasize t h i s 
by d e f i n i n g and describing i t as essentially a reaction 
against convention i n art,, rather than just a s t r a i g h t -
forward attempt to copy r e a l i t y . At a p r a c t i c a l l e v e l , 
Gombrich t r i e s to show how the creation of a r e a l i s t i c 
representation i n painting comes about by a d i a l e c t i c of 
schema and correction,by the t e s t i n g of the conventional 
schemata against r e a l l i f e , and t h e i r consequent 
modification. His analysis of realism makes i t dependent 
upon the a r t i s t i c conventions of the past: 
"the i l l u s i o n s of a r t are not only the f r u i t , 
but also the indispensible tools f o r the a r t i s t ' s 
analysis of appearances." (1) 
At the t h e o r e t i c a l l e v e l , too, the aims of the r e a l i s t s are 
more adequately described as an attempt to l i b e r a t e a r t 
from convention, and not just as an attempt; to imitate l i f e 
and nature. One w r i t e r who p a r t i c u l a r l y emphasises t h i s 
aspect of realism i s Harry Levin. He describes realism as: 
"an endeavour to emancipate l i t e r a t u r e from the 
sway of conventions." (2) 
(1) Art and I l l u s i o n p.25 
(2) The Gates of Horn p.19 
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And he describes the r e a l i s t i c method as: 
"a l i t e r a r y technique of systematic 
disillusionment." (1) 
" f i c t i o n approximates t r u t h , not by concealing 
a r t , but exposing a r t i f i c e . " (2) 
Linda Nochlin, too, t a l k s of the aims of realism i n much 
the same terms: 
"that perennially obsessive desire of a r t i s t s to 
bring r e a l i t y back a l i v e , to escape from the 
bonds of convention i n t o a magic world of pure 
v e r i s i m i l i t u d e . " (3) 
This idea of realism as a reaction to conventional 
representation i n a r t i s important, not only as a more 
adequate characterization of what realism involves, and 
what the r e a l i s t i s t r y i n g to do, than simply "copying 
r e a l i t y " : but also because i t i s the foundation upon which 
the moral argxjment f o r realism rests. The moral argument 
claims that a r t misrepresents the world, and that such 
misrepresentations can lead to morally dangerous 
misconceptions and a t t i t u d e s , which i t i s necessary to 
di s p e l . One way of doing t h i s i s through r e a l i s t i c a r t . 
Thus the moral argument i s not based on the theory that a rt 
ought to imitate r e a l i t y ; but on the fac t that a rt does 
im i t a t e r e a l i t y , and often imitates i t wrongly. Here again 
the importance of looking at realism as a development 
w i t h i n a representational t r a d i t i o n , i s apparent. 
(1) The Gates of Hbrm- p.48 
(2) The Gates of Horn p.49 
(3) Realism p.15 
(69) 
Chapter 4: The Moral Argument 
The point which I wish to make about what I have 
ca l l e d the moral argument, i s that here we have what seems 
to be a consistent and widely-accepted l i n e of thought 
about realism, which i s based on very d i f f e r e n t 
considerations and reaches very d i f f e r e n t conclusions 
from the aesthetic arguments examined before. The 
implications of " a r t must t e l l t^e t r u t h " - a very much 
over-simplified statement of the moral argument - are, or 
appear to be, quite contrary to the implications of 
"realism i s not a r t " , 
I.The Formulation of the Moral Argument 
Although I have j u s t claimed that the moral argument 
i s widely accepted, i t i s perhaps misleading to refer to 
i t as an argument at a l l , because i t i s seldom form-
ulated i n any d e t a i l . I t i s assumed and implied i n the 
theory and practice- of many w r i t e r s , but t h e i r e x p l i c i t 
statements of i t leave much to be desired. Theodore 
Dreiser, quoted e a r l i e r , claims t h a t : 
"The sum and substance of l i t e r a r y as well as 
social morality may be expressed i n three 
words - t e l l the t r u t h . " ( l ) 
This i s , i n essence, the moral argument f o r realism: but 
as i t stands i t i s scarcely tenable. Not only i s i t 
exaggerated; i t also lays i t s e l f open to a number of 
(1) "True Art Speaks P l a i n l y ' DMLR p,155 
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more sp e c i f i c and, apparently, damaging objections. 
What r i g h t have we to demand that a r t should t e l l the 
t r u t h , when the a r t i s t does not claim, and i s not t r y i n g , 
to do anything of the kind? Why equate t r u t h w i th realism 
anyway? And i s t r u t h of such over-riding importance to 
morality? These are the main objections which come to 
mind when we are confronted with just the simple assertion 
tha t a r t must t e l l the t r u t h . I t seems both unnecessarily 
m o r a l i s t i c and completely out of touch with the real 
nature of a r t and of our response to i t . But the reasons 
behind the demand f o r t r u t h i n a r t seem to be, i n many 
cases, much more complex and subtle. A more adequate 
idea of what the r e a l i s t ' s demand f o r t r u t h i s a l l about, 
can be gained i f we are sensitive and responsive to other, 
less e x p l i c i t , and seemingly unrelated, suggestions and 
assumptions which occur i n the work of wri t e r s both 
w i t h i n and outside the r e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n . The simple 
demand that a r t should be true has to be supplemented 
by other, more unobtrusive considerations before we can 
be persuaded to take i t seriously. But when a f u l l e r 
p i c t u r e emerges, and when the necessary q u a l i f i c a t i o n s 
and l i m i t a t i o n s of app l i c a t i o n have been made, the moral 
argument i s r e a l l y quite persuasive. There i s obviously 
a l o t of room f o r s u b j e c t i v i t y and d i s t o r t i o n i n an 
attempt to reconstruct an argument from casual hints 
and implications: but i f we ignore them, we do not do 
j u s t i c e to the argument f o r realism, and are i n danger 
of dismissing as s u p e r f i c i a l and f a c i l e a po s i t i o n which, 
i f i t were more f u l l y defined, could carry a great deal 
of conviction. 
(71) 
I t i s i n the r e a l i s t i c novel i t s e l f that some of 
the most emphatic and fully-developed presentations of 
the moral argument are to be foxmd. I n a more l i g h t -
hearted vein, i t i s suggested by the main theme of 
Cervantes' Don Quixote and Jane Austen's Northanger 
Abbey; the differences between the occurrences. of 
ordinary l i f e , and the kind of th i n g which we are led 
to expect i n the t y p i c a l Romantic or Gothic novel. 
But f o r a more serious treatment of the same theme, we 
should t u r n to Flaubert's Madame Bovary. Flaubert 
d i s t r u s t e d the l a b e l of " r e a l i s t " , but Madame Bovary 
makes a very good s t a r t i n g point f o r an examination of 
the moral considerations i n favour of realism. 
Madame Bovary i s essentially the story of a young 
woman, Emma Bovary, whose expectations of, and attitudes 
towards, l i f e are quite disproportionate and irr e l e v a n t 
to her actual s i t u a t i o n . She i s the daughter of a 
f a i r l y well-to-do p r o v i n c i a l farmer, married to a good-
natured, but not very prepossessing, doctor. Her 
a t t i t u d e s , however, are to a great extent derived from 
Romantic and sentimental l i t e r a t u r e . I n Chapter 6, i n 
which he describes Emma's education, Flaubert emphasises 
the way i n which her reading of Romantic l i t e r a t u r e has 
influenced her whole outlook on l i f e : 
"She had read 'Paul and V i r g i n i a ' , and seen i n her 
dreams the l i t t l e bamboo hut, Domingo the nigger 
and F a i t h f u l the dog, and, above a l l , the dear 
l i t t l e brother, gentle and lovin g , who fetches down 
r e c r u i t s f o r you from great trees t a l l e r than 
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church steeples, or comes running barefoot along 
the sands to bring you a bird's nest." (1) 
"They were a i l about love and lovers, damsels i n 
distress swooning i n lonely lodges, p o s t i l l i o n s 
slaughtered a l l along the road, horses ridden to 
death on every page, gloomy fores t s , troubles of 
the heart, vows, sobs, tears, kisses, rowing-boats 
i n the moonlight, nightingales i n the grove, 
gentlemen brave as li o n s and gentle as lambs, too 
virtuous to be tr u e , invariably well-dressed, and 
weeping l i k e fountains,.. And so f o r six months 
of her sixteenth year, Emma soiled her hands with 
t h i s refuse of old lending l i b r a r i e s . " (2) 
The effects of t h i s "education^' are f e l t throughout the 
book, and Flaubert's irony never l e t s us forget the 
fiindaraental discrepancy between the kind of l i f e which 
has captured Emma's imagination, and the actual poss-
i b i l i t i e s of her existence. The consequences of t h i s 
discrepancy are d r a s t i c . I t i s not just that Emma 
l i v e s i n a sort of dream-world, divorced from real l i f e , 
but that her r e a l l i f e i s corrupted and ruined because 
she finds i t impossible to accept l i f e as i t r e a l l y i s , 
and accept her r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n i t . The whole 
discussion of her education, i s prompted by her disappoint-
ment w i t h her marriage - a disappointment which i s 
e x p l i c i t l y and unambiguously related to the false 
expectations which she has derived from l i t e r a t u r e : 
(1.) Madame Bovary p.48. 
(2) Madame Bovary p.50. 
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"Before the v/edding, she had believed herself i n love 
But not having obtained the happiness that: should 
have resulted from that love, she now fancied that 
she must have been mistaken. And Emma wondered 
exactly what was meant i n l i f e by the w?ords ' b l i s s ' , 
'passion?, 'ecstasy', which had looked so be a u t i f u l 
i n books." ( l ) 
Emma's ch a r a c t e r i s t i c state of mind i s one of "ennui", 
a sense of boredom and disappointment with l i f e f o r 
f a i l i n g to come up to expectations. I n her attempts to 
f i n d i n l i f e the charm and the excitement to which she 
had been accustomed i n her reading, she i s led to deceit, 
debt, i n f i d e l i t y and f i n a l l y to despair and suicide. 
Not only i s Emma d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h l i f e ; t h i s i s only 
one aspect of the inadequacy of her att i t u d e s . She i s 
also incapable of responding genuinely or " r e a l i s t i c a l l y " 
to the si t u a t i o n s w i t h which she actually has to deal. 
Flaubert brings t h i s out p a r t i c u l a r l y with regard to 
Emma's a t t i t u d e to death. Some time before she commits 
suicide, Emma has been i l l and thinks that she i s going 
to die. Her response i s nothing but a mass of sent-
imental confectionery: 
"Her f l e s h found rest from thought; a new l i f e had 
begun; i t was as i f her soul, ascending to God, 
were about to be swallowed up i n His love l i k e 
burning incense vanishing i n smoke Then she 
l e t her head drop back on to the pi l l o w , seeming 
to hear through space the harps of the seraphs 
(1) Madame Bovary p.47. 
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playing, and to see, seated upon a throne of gold 
i n an azure Heaven with His Saints around Him 
bearing branches of green palm, God the Father, 
resplendent i n majesty, at whose command angels 
w i t h wings of flame descended to Earth to carry 
her up i n t h e i r arms." (1) 
Here there i s just no awareness of the ugliness or horror 
of death, of the sort of physical or s p i r i t u a l s u f f e r i n g 
which are to characterize her actual deathbed: 
"At once her lungs began to heave ra p i d l y , the 
whole of her tongue protruded from her mouth, her 
r o l l i n g eyes turned pale l i k e the globes of two 
gut t e r i n g lamps: she might have been dead already 
but f o r the f r i g h t f u l o s c i l l a t i o n of her r i b s , 
t h a t shook w i t h furious gusts as though her soul 
were leaping to get free'.' (2) 
And her l a s t v i s i o n i s no longer of God the Father, but 
of the b l i n d beggar, who has appeared at various stages 
of her downfall: 
"And Emma started laughing, a ghastly, f r a n t i c , 
desperate laugh, fancying she could see the 
hideous face of the beggar r i s i n g up l i k e a 
nightmare amid the eternal darkness." (3) 
I t i s not only i n r e l a t i o n to Emma that Flaubert offers 
us a contrast between the conventions of l i t e r a t u r e and 
what he represents as re a l l i f e . The whole book i s 
constmcted around t h i s p r i n c i p l e . Emma's d i s i l l u s i o n -
ment i s part of the story, but the book i t s e l f i s meant 
(1) Madame Bovary;Part 2. Chap.14. pp. 224/5 
(2) Madame Bovary:Part3. Chap. 8. p.336. 
(3) Madame Bovary;Part3. Chap. 8. p.337. 
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also SLS a shock to the conventional expectations of the 
reader, Charles Bovary, Emma's husband, f o r instance, 
presents us w i t h an unusual combination of almost s a i n t l y 
goodness, and u t t e r s t u p i d i t y . At the other end of the 
scale, the s e l f i s h and s e l f - s a t i s f i e d chemist, Homais, 
does not get what i n many books would be his just deserts, 
but continues to go from strength to strength. 
I n Madame Bovary, Flaubert pushes his theme as f a r 
as i t can go, and i t i s , i f anything, an overstatement 
of the moral argument. From t h i s book, however, v\?e can 
get a much clearer idea of the sort of reasoning which 
l i e s behind the r e a l i s t ' s demand f o r t r u t h i n a r t ; or 
at least of one possible l i n e of reasoning which could 
l i e behind i t . We can, too, f i n d many echoes of the 
same kind of argument i n the work of other w r i t e r s , 
which helps to give us a f u l l e r picture of what the moral 
argiiment f o r realism would be, i f i t were more thoroughly 
analysed and formulated. 
The d i s t o r t e d representation of l i f e i n a r t , so 
the argument would seem to go;, fosters responses i n 
those who are influenced by i t , which are i n v a l i d and 
inadequate f o r l i f e . Unrealistic a r t encourages people 
to develop a t t i t u d e s and expectations which are completely 
inappropriate to r e a l l i f e ; r e s u l t i n g i n a f a i l u r e t o 
come to terms w i t h l i f e ' s actual p o s s i b i l i t i e s , problems 
and moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . This i s precisely the 
c r i t i c i s m of u n r e a l i s t i c , and p a r t i c u l a r l y i d e a l i s t i c 
a r t , which George E l i o t makes: 
"And I would not, even i f I had the choice, be the 
clever novelist who could create a v/orld so much 
bette r than t h i s , i n which we get up i n the morn-
ing to do our d a i l y work, that you would be l i k e l y 
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to t u r n a harder, colder eye on the dusty 
streets and the common green f i e l d s - on 
the r e a l , breathing men and women who can 
be c h i l l e d by your indifference or injured 
by your prejudice." (1) 
One of the best statements of the kind of d i s t o r t i o n of 
consciousness of which the r e a l i s t i s a f r a i d comes from 
a w r i t e r who, paradoxically, does not advocate a r e a l i s t 
p o s i t i o n , I.A. Richards. I n his discussion of bad art 
he says: 
"The losses incurred by these a r t i f i c i a l 
f i x a t i o n s of attitudes are evident. Through 
them, the average adult i s worse, not better, 
adjusted to the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of his e x i s t -
ence than the c h i l d . He i s even i n the 
most important things f u n c t i o n a l l y unable to 
face f a c t s : do what he w i l l , he i s only 
able to face f i c t i o n s , f i c t i o n s projected 
by his own stock responses." (2) 
The r e a l i s t would agree e n t i r e l y w i t h t h i s analysis, 
which would, i n c i d e n t a l l y , f i t Flaubert's presentation 
of Emma Bovary p e r f e c t l y . But the r e a l i s t would also 
claim that there was a dir e c t r e l a t i o n between unreal-
i s t i c a t t i t u d e s and u n r e a l i s t i c a r t , a question which 
w i l l have to be examined i n more d e t a i l l a t e r . We even 
f i n d Dr. Johnson suggesting a s i m i l a r reason f o r approving 
of the r e a l i s t i c and disapproving of the u n r e a l i s t i c i n 
a r t : 
"This, therefore i s the praise of Shakespeare, 
Adam Bede Chap 17 
P r i n c i p l e s of L i t e r a r y C r i t i c i s m , p.203-
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that his drama i s the mirror of l i f e , that 
he who has mazed his imagination i n following 
the phantoms which other wri t e r s raise up 
before him, may here be cured of his d e l i r i o u s 
ecstasies, be reading human sentiments i n 
human'language," ( l ) 
I t i s t h i s basic preoccupation w i t h the dangers of the 
"dreamings of a di s t o r t e d imagination" (2) 
which i s at the centre of the moral argument f o r realism 
i n a r t . Essentially, the argument i s concerned with the 
dangers of u n r e a l i s t i c a r t ; but t h i s cannot r e a l l y be 
separated from the requirement of realism. For i f we^  
object t o unrealism i n a work of a r t , we seem to be 
implying that i t ought to.have been r e a l i s t i c . Thus, 
George E l i o t , i n the passage from Adam Bede already 
J' 
r e f e r r e d t o , i s not only suspicious of u n r e a l i s t i c rep-
resentation, but therefore feels an obli g a t i o n to o f f e r 
us a r e a l i s t i c one instead: 
" I f e e l as much boimd to t e l l you as precisely 
as I can v^hat that r e f l e c t i o n i s , as i f I 
were i n the witness-box, narrating my exper-
ience on oath." (3) 
The existence of u n r e a l i s t i c , romantic and i d e a l i s t i c 
works of ar t i s also f e l t to create a need f o r r e a l i s t i c 
works as a corrective. This, as we saw, was one of the 
functions of Madame Bovary; and the same kind of idea 
seems to have been i n the minds of Edmond and Jules de 
Goncourt, when they wrote: 
"The public loves false novels: t h i s i s a true one" 
(4) 
(1) Preface to Shakespeare. Selected V/orks pp.266/7 
(2} Chernishevsky: L i f e and Aesthetics, DMLR fi. 51 
(3) Adam Bede Chap, 17. piLR p-."ll3T 
(4) Preface Germinie LacerteiAX. SMLR, p , l l 8 
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To set the moral argument i n i t s context, as I have 
been t r y i n g to do, helps to defend i t against many of the 
objections which can be made to the simple assertion that 
a r t must t e l l the t r u t h . The moral argument rests on 
c e r t a i n unproven, and perhaps unprovable, assumptions 
about psychology and morality, and i t cannot be made 
absolutely water-tight. The aesthetic argument, on the 
other hand, r e s t i n g as i t does on the implications of 
the d e f i n i t i o n of a r t , i s much simpler and much t i d i e r . 
But i t i s possible,to show that many of the objections to 
the argument w i t h which we are dealing at the moment rest 
on a misunderstanding of what i t i s r e a l l y about; and 
that the assumptions upon which i t rests are, although 
not undeniable, at least very much i n l i n e with current 
trends of thought. The moral argument i s worthy of more 
serious consideration than i t usually gets. 
One of the most important ways i n which an under-
standing of the context of the moral argument helps to 
strengthen i t , i s by suggesting the l i m i t a t i o n s of i t s 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y . I t seems to be rather fatuous to object 
to any and every case of unrealism i n art as untrue and 
therefore immoral. There are some cases to which v;e 
f e e l that the need f o r realism i s much greater than i t 
i s i n others. The argument f o r realism tends to arise 
i n reaction to romantic, sentimental, i d e a l i s t i c and 
melodramatic a r t , and i t i s only i n r e l a t i o n to art of 
such kinds that i t i s r e a l l y compelling. What the 
r e a l i s t i s a f r a i d of i s the propagation of misconceptions 
about r e a l i t y , and, very closely related to t h i s , the 
development of inadequate and irr e l e v a n t a t t i t u d e s on 
the part of the public. They tend, therefore, to be 
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suspicious of a r t which appears to be straightforwardly-
representational, and yet i s exaggerated or dis t o r t e d i n 
some way; and which f a l l s i n t o patterns which, although 
u n r e a l i s t i c , appeal easily to the imagination, and so 
might exert a dangerous influence over our attitudes and 
responses to l i f e . Thus realism sees as i t s greatest 
enemy, a r t which represents l i f e as more e x c i t i n g , Just, 
or glamorous than i t r e a l l y i s , and not a r t which modifies 
representation i n order to s t a r t l e us and make us think. 
I t i s i m l i k e l y that the r e a l i s t would have much quarrel 
w i t h the kind of u n r e a l i s t i c a r t produced by Beckett or 
Kafka or even w i t h some sorts of science f i c t i o n . His 
quarrel i s much more l i k e l y to be w i t h the w r i t e r of 
popular adventure s t o r i e s , or romantic seri a l s i n women's 
magazines. 
Neither does the moral argument give us any reason 
f o r demanding t r u t h about the kinds of things which are 
i r r e l e v a n t t o morality. This helps to explain why a 
moral concern w i t h realism tends to alrise much more i n 
l i t e r a t u r e than i n connection with the visual a r t s . 
I t i s of no great moral consequence i f we are confused 
and not very much aware of what the vi s u a l appearances 
of things are r e a l l y l i k e . I t i s of consequence, 
however, i f we are unaware of what people are r e a l l y l i k e , 
and what sort of things can reasonably be expected to 
happen i n l i f e . Since i t i s l i t e r a t u r e , rather than the 
v i s u a l a r t s , which could be expected to influence our 
a t t i t u d e s t o l i f e i n general, i t i s to l i t e r a t u r e , and 
to the representation of character and action w i t h i n 
l i t e r a t u r e , that the moral argument tends basi c a l l y to 
apply. The moral argxament, then, does not commit us to 
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saying that a r t must always be r e a l i s t i c i n every respect. 
But i t does say that there are some circumstances i n which 
there i s a need f o r r e a l i s t i c representation. 
There are three other important l i n e s along which the 
r e a l i s t ' s demand f o r t r u t h i n art can be c r i t i c i z e d . 
Is a work of a r t the kind of thi n g of which t r u t h can be 
demanded as a moral obligation? Why i d e n t i f y t r u t h v^ith 
realism? And are true a t t i t u d e s , and true attitudes 
only, of moral value? These objections tend to make the 
r e a l i s t look as though he i s very naively, and very heavy-
handedly t r y i n g t o apply one p a r t i c u l a r moral p r i n c i p l e , i n 
a context where i t i s inapplicable, and i n ways which are 
inappropriate. But here again, a f u l l e r sense of the 
context of the argument and the considerations upon which 
i t i s based help, i f not to prove the argument, at leastb 
to show that i t i s the objections, rather than the moral 
argument i t s e l f , which have missed the point. 
I I . Art and Attitudes. 
The r e a l i s t claims that a rt ought t o t e l l the t r u t h . 
But i t i s only legitimate to make t h i s claim i f a r t i s the 
sort of s i t u a t i o n to which i t i s applicable. For, however 
important we may th i n k t r u t h i s , there are a l o t of c i r c -
umstances i n which we would never dream of demanding that, 
the t r u t h be t o l d ; not because we think that the t r u t h 
should not be t o l d , but because the very concept of t r u t h 
has no use or meaning i n the context. 
V/e only require t r u t h , or so i t seems, when somebody 
i s g i v i n g us some information. And many people would say, 
very p l a u s i b l y , that since the a r t i s t never, or at least 
very seldom, claims that his representation i s a f a i t h f u l 
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picture of l i f e , then we are never, or very seldom, j u s t i f i e d 
i n demanding that i t should be t r u t h f u l i n the sense of 
r e a l i s t i c . This i s the most important, and the most 
f o r c e f u l , of the objections to the moral argument. There 
are, of course, a few works of a r t - and they form a very 
subordinate class, mostly of minor works - which claim to 
be g i v i n g us a f a i t h f u l picture of what l i f e i s l i k e . 
And i n these cases there would be l i t t l e argument about 
the v a l i d i t y of saying that they ought to t e l l the t r u t h . 
I n t h i s context i t would be almost t r i v i a l . But the 
r e a l i s t seems to be saying that even works of art which 
have no pretentions to being f a i t h f u l and accurate documents 
ought to be judged by the standard of t h e i r truthfulness. 
Put l i k e t h i s , i t c e r t a i n l y does seem to be a highly 
questionable claim; and i t i s frequently urged that we 
can have no r i g h t to demand t r u t h of something which does 
not make any claim to be true. This i s the l i n e of defence 
which P h i l i p Sidney adopts i n response to the objection 
that poetry i s the "mother of l i e s " : 
"Now, f o r the Poet, he nothing affirmes, and 
therefore never l y e t h . " ( l ) 
In a more recent discussion of the subject by Alan Rodway, 
the same point i s made and elaborated: and the r e a l i s t ' s 
point of view i s held up as an example of a " n a t u r a l i s t i c 
f a l l a c y " : 
"Properly taken, however, ' t r u t h t o ' leads to 
the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y , when closeness to 
(1) An Apologie f o r Poetrie. p38. 
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l i f e i s taken as the sole standard of judgement, 
realism the sole proper mode of being. Of 
course., l i t t l e fallaciousness i s involved i f 
the work c l e a r l y purports to be a work of 
realism, (though i t does no harm to bear i n 
mind that i n p r i n c i p l e even such a work could 
be considered from other angles, moral, l i n g -
u i s t i c , sociological and so f o r t h ) . Often 
enough, however, works which make no pretence 
of realism are si&ply disparaged as absurd or 
fa h t a s t i c or not 'true to l i f e ' . " (1) 
But t h i s objection, convincing though i t i s , seems to 
me to miss the whole point of the r e a l i s t ' s argujnent. The 
r e a l i s t , as much as anyone else, i s aware that many works of 
ar t make no claim to be true:. Yet he does not f e e l that t h i s 
makes i t impossible f o r him to demand that they ought to be 
tr u e . He does not do t h i s because he i s unbalanced or unduly 
conscientious, but because he thinks that he can see another 
f a c t o r , apart from a spe c i f i c claim to be true, which 
could provide a reason f o r applying the c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h 
t o a r t . 
This f a c t o r i s not a l o g i c a l , but a psychological one. 
I t does not matter so much just that something purports or 
does not purport to be true information. Y/hat i s also 
important i s whether or not i t influences and directs our 
awareness of l i f e , a n d our attitudes to i t . Truth i s 
important because i t i s essential t o a f u l l understanding 
of the world, and thence t o the development of genuine, 
adequate and responsible reactions to i t . I f , as the 
r e a l i s t argues, u n r e a l i s t i c art,, no less than an actual 
(1) The Truths of F i c t i o n p.90 
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falsehood, can provide us with misconceptions about the 
world, and unsatisfactory attitudes to i t , then we surely 
have the same r i g h t , o b l i g a t i o n even, to demand realism 
i n a r t as we have to demand t r u t h i n evidence. 
The important question, then, i s not what the work 
of a r t purports to be, but the way i n v^hich i t i s capable 
of in f l u e n c i n g us. And i t i s one of the assumptions of 
the moral argument that a work of a r t can influence our 
awareness of l i f e , even when we recognize that i t i s not, 
and does not claim to be, true. This i s c l e a r l y a 
psychological question, and whether or not the moral 
argument can stand up depends u l t i m a t e l y upon whether or 
not i t i s i n f a c t t r u e that a r t has t h i s sort of influence 
upon; us. This i s the sort of question which could hardly 
be v e r i f i e d i n anything l i k e a sa t i s f a c t o r y way, but there 
does seem to be quite a l o t i n favour of the way i n v/hich 
the r e a l i s t i s arguing. 
Simply from the evidence of experience and introspection, 
i t would be, f o r me at le a s t , hard to deny that one does 
tend to re l a t e s i t u a t i o n s which one meets i n r e a l i t y to 
s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s , however f i c t i o n a l , previously encountered 
i n l i t e r a t u r e , and one also tends to be very susceptible 
t o , and fascinated by, some of the patterns of experience 
which occur throughout l i t e r a t u r e , but perhaps not throughout 
l i f e . I t i s much easier to admit than to deny t h a t , to 
some degree, our consciousness and our imagination are 
influenced by the sort of th i n g we come across i n a r t , and 
are influenced i n much the same v^ ay that the r e a l i s t 
suggests. The s i t u a t i o n of Emma Bovary, although no doubt 
exaggerated, i s one which must be recognized by many, and 
(84) 
and i t c e r t a i n l y does not s t r i k e the reader as p a r t i c u l a r l y 
implausible that a g i r l who has been brought up on romantic 
and sentimental l i t e r a t u r e should have d i f f i c u l t y i n coming 
to terms w i t h r e a l l i f e . 
AsvWell as t h i s , the r e a l i s t ' s assumptions about 
psychology seem, paradoxically, to be supported by the kind 
of argument which i s frequently put forward to show the 
alleged i m p o s s i b i l i t y of realism i n a r t . The current 
emphasis upon the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of a passive experience of 
r e a l i t y , and the part which past experiences and mental 
conceptualization play i n the construction of an i n t e l l i g i b l e 
world, i n t h i s case serves to reinforce the argument of the 
r e a l i s t . An a r t i s t i c representation usually offers us a 
very highly - and very c l e a r l y - organised experience, and 
i t would be rash t o deny that a r t has perhaps quite a strong 
influence upon our consciousness of the world. 
The r e a l i s t ' s case, then, i s not very much affected by 
the f a c t that not a l l works of a r t claim to be t e l l i n g the 
t r u t h . The moral argument, although, as we have seen, 
l i m i t e d i n i t s a p p l i c a b i l i t y , l e g i t i m a t e l y applies to more 
works of a r t than those which s p e c i f i c a l l y claim to be 
t r u t h f u l . The main question, from t h i s point of view, i s 
whether or not a r t influences our av\fareness as the r e a l i s t 
says i t does. And to t h i s i t would seem to be possible 
to answer that i t does. 
I I I . Truth i n Art. 
Even granted a degree of respect f o r t r u t h , why should 
we equate t r u t h and realism? But the problem of what 
constitutes t r u t h i n a r t i s a very wide t o p i c , and not one 
which could be f u l l y dealt with here. Realism, as i s often 
(85) 
pointed out, i s not the only t h i n g w i t h which a r t i s t i c 
t r u t h can be i d e n t i f i e d . But when we look i n more d e t a i l 
at the reasoning behind the moral argument, we can see why 
i t should be neither a r b i t r a r y nor unwarranted, but perfe c t l y 
n a t u r a l , f o r the r e a l i s t to consider realism as the fund-
amental meaning of t r u t h here. Again i t i s the c r i t i c of 
realism, rather than the r e a l i s t himself, who seems to be 
ignoring s i g n i f i c a n t considerations. 
The sort of t r u t h which i s deraandi.d by the moral 
argument, t r u t h about what i s being represented, i s , to 
adopt the terminology of Damian Grant i n Realism, a t r u t h 
of correspondence rather than coherence. And one of the 
more common ways of t r y i n g to f o r e s t a l l the moral argument 
i s by s u b s t i t u t i n g a coherence f o r a correspondence theory 
of t r u t h i n a r t , the l i n e which Grant i n fact adopts. 
The coherence theory has the advantage of being pe r f e c t l y 
compatible w i t h t y p i c a l aesthetic theories. Coherence 
i t s e l f , meaning the i n t e r n a l consistency of the work, i s 
an aspect of formal u n i t y , and can thus be seen as a 
p o s i t i v e aesthetic q u a l i t y . At the same time i t can claim 
a c e r t a i n , though dubious, moral status as ' t r u t h ' , thus 
apparently eliminating any c o n f l i c t there might be between 
moral and aesthetic considerations. Grant quotes Flaubert's 
theory as a t y p i c a l example of the coherence theory: 
" 'Ce qui me semble beau, ce que je voudrais 
f a i r e , c'est un- l i v r e sur r i e n , un l i v r e sans 
attache exterieure, qui se t i e n d r a i t de lui-meme 
par l a force interne de son s t y l e , corame l a 
t e r r e sans etre soutenue se t i e n t en I ' a i r , 
un l i v r e qui n'aurait presque pas de sujet, ou 
du moins ou l e sujet s e r a i t presque i n v i s i b l e , 
(86) 
s i cela se peut....' (Correspondence I I 345/6) 
There could be no clearer, more f i n a l statement 
of the coherence theory of realism than t h i s -
and no plainer i l l u s t r a t i o n of how t h i s theory 
supersedes the clumsier idea of establishing 
t r u t h by the laborious process of correspondence." 
(1) 
The assumption of the s u p e r i o r i t y , from an aesthetic point of 
view, of the coherence over the correspondence theory, seems 
to be f a i r l y t y p i c a l of discussions of t r u t h i n a r t outside 
the r e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n . The imp l i c a t i o n seems to be th a t , 
even i f we can demand t r u t h i n a r t , t h i s i s not the same as 
a demand f o r realism. But one cannot simply s u s t i t u t e 
coherence f o r correspondence as the c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h i n 
a r t , and presume that t h i s s a t i s f i e s the moral argument's 
requirement of t r u t h . For i n the context of the moral 
argument, a correspondence theory of t r u t h i s the only kind 
of theory which i s applicable; and no matter how important, 
i n other respects, the i n t e r n a l consistency of a work of 
ar t may be, i t i s quite without relevance to the moral 
argument. For i f we require t r u t h i n a r t , because we are 
a f r a i d of the d i s t o r t i o n of our attitudes to l i f e , then the 
sort of t r u t h which we require can only be a t r u t h of 
correspondence betv/een the representation and the r e a l i t y 
which i t represents. 
The same sort of l i n e can be taken with most of the 
other candidates f o r the t i t l e of " t r u t h " i n a r t . Although, 
considered out of context, they have as much r i g h t , perhaps, 
as realism, to be called " t r u t h " , they do not s a t i s f y the 
(1) Realism, p.17. 
(87) 
requirements of the moral argument. A case could be made 
out f o r saying that almost any representational work of art 
i n some way t e l l s the t r u t h : that i t takes r e a l i t y as i t s 
s t a r t i n g - p o i n t and expresses i t i n some way. But a work of 
a r t which i s true i n t h i s way would not necessarily be one 
which helped to counter the possible misconceptions and 
d i s t o r t i o n s of a t t i t u d e s which could be brought about by a r t , 
For t h i s purpose, realism comes much closer to the sort of 
t r u t h which i s required. 
The r e a l i s t does not have any quarrel with art such as 
caricature, or the kind of exaggerated or a l l e g o r i c a l a r t 
which points out features of the world, and obviously does 
so, rather than provides us with a "true" representation of i t , 
But i t i s the l a t t e r which, f o r the r e a l i s t , i s the primary 
and central meaning of " t r u t h " i n the context of the moral 
argument, although the former can also be said to be " t r u t h " 
of a d i f f e r e n t kind. The f i r s t p r i o r i t y of the r e a l i s t i s 
to a t t a i n a clear and undistorted picture of what l i f e i s 
l i k e . And t h i s purpose i s better served by straightforward 
realism than by drawing a t t e n t i o n to p a r t i c u l a r aspects of 
experience i n the manner, say, of the Theatre of the Absurd, 
or a c a r i c a t u r i s t . The sort of things which a r t i s t s l i k e 
Ibnesco or Hogarth emphasize i n t h e i r vi,'ork may very we l l be 
tr u e . The very technique of emphasis, however, which i s 
used to point such things out to us i s an obstacle to our 
estimation of just how prevalent and s i g n i f i c a n t such aspects 
of experience r e a l l y are. I n order to assess t h i s , we need 
precisely that imdistorted and l i t e r a l picture of l i f e which 
the r e a l i s t i s t r y i n g to give us. Although we can accept; 
that there are other kinds of t r u t h i n art apart from realism, 
there i s s t i l l a case f o r saying that i t i s not only t r u t h . 
(88) 
but also realism which i s , i n some cases, required of a r t . 
Thus what at f i r s t sight seems to be a rather a r b i t r a r y 
and u n j u s t i f i a b l e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of realism and t r u t h , can 
be seen to be p e r f e c t l y consistent when the aims and 
implications of the moral argument are taken i n t o account. 
I t i s also possible to object to the equation of realism 
and t r u t h on the grounds that t r u t h i n art i s impossible. 
The arguments involved here are the same as those which we 
encoimtered when discussing the alleged i m p o s s i b i l i t y of 
realism. Since what the r e a l i s t means by t r u t h i n a r t i s 
realism, the objection tends to resolve i t s e l f i n t o the 
question whether realism i t s e l f i s possible, which we have 
already dealt with. Absolute t r u t h , l i k e absolute realism, 
must be admitted to be unattainable by a r t ; but i t i s s t i l l 
possible f o r some works of a r t to be more true, or true i n 
more important respects, than others. 
The problem of f i c t i o n seems to crop up i n an even more 
acute form w i t h the concept of " t r u t h " than i t did with the 
concept of "realism". Truth i s normally a notion reserved 
f o r matters of f a c t , w h i l s t f i c t i o n , i n contexts other than 
a r t , i s generally called f a l s i f i c a t i o n or l y i n g . To claim 
that f i c t i o n can be true i s c e r t a i n l y unusual. But here 
again we must remember that what the r e a l i s t means by t r u t h 
i s not h i s t o r i c a l t r u t h , but the sort of representation 
which w i l l not mislead us about what the world i s l i k e , or 
make us u n f i t to l i v e i n i t . As long as the representation 
i s " l i k e r e a l i t y " i n the more general sense, (and we saw 
e a r l i e r that f o r t h i s to be so, i t does not have to be 
modelled on any actual object or event), then i t can be said 
to be, i n the r e a l i s t ' s sense, true. I t i s i n t h i s context 
that we should remember the e a r l i e r objection that very few 
(89) 
works of a r t purport to be h i s t o r i c a l l y true; and the 
importance of h i s t o r i c a l t r u t h i s very s l i g h t i n any theory 
of a r t , however strongly orientated towards realism. That 
a r t i s concerned w i t h general t r u t h s , however, i s an idea 
v/hich has had the most respectable h i s t o r y , and i s e x p l i c i t l y 
formulated by A r i s t o t l e i n his Poetics: 
" I t i s not the poet's function to describe what 
has a c t u a l l y happened, but the kinds of things 
that might happen, that i s , that could happen 
because they are, i n the circumstances, either 
probable or necessary For t h i s reason, 
poetry i s something more philosophical and more 
worthy of serious a t t e n t i o n than hist o r y ; f o r 
while poetry i s concerned with universal t r u t h s , 
h i s t o r y t r e a t s of p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s . " (1) 
IV. Truth and Morality. 
One of the most i n t e r e s t i n g , and perhaps the most 
d i f f i c u l t , of the problems which are raised by the moral 
argument, i s the question of the relationship between t r u t h 
and" morality. Both the i n t e r e s t and the d i f f i c u l t y arise 
from the f a c t that the question i s not a f a c t u a l or l o g i c a l 
one, but a question of moral p r i n c i p l e . 
On some views, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between morality and 
t r u t h i s not a p a r t i c u l a r l y strong one. Sometimes, and 
t h i s i s the view of the propagandist, i t i s thought to be 
b e t t e r f o r morality i f people do not always have a very 
clear idea of the sort of things that actually happen. 
(1) Poetics. Classical "Literary C r i t i c i s m , p. 43. 
(90) 
One Renaissance theory of tragedy, f o r instance, was that 
i t was meant to discourage rulers from becoming tyrants by 
impressing upon them the Awful Doom which awaited them i f 
they did. A r e a l i s t would be much more l i k e l y to show you 
a t y r a n t who prospered. The same sort of p r i n c i p l e i s 
involved i n the way i n which crime i s depicted on t e l e v i s i o n . 
On t e l e v i s i o n , the criminal i s seldom, i f ever, allowed to 
get away wi t h his crime. The r e a l i s t ' s work, i n which the 
cri m i n a l was not brought to j u s t i c e , would, on t h i s l i n e of 
argument, be seen as an active encouragement to vice. 
Prom the point of view of social morality and s t a b i l i t y , 
there i s quite a l o t to be said f o r t h i s kind of a t t i t u d e 
to a r t . But from the point of view of the i n d i v i d u a l , i t 
may be seen as depriving him of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of making 
his own decisions on the basis of a true avrareness of what 
l i f e i s l i k e . This r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and the honest approach 
to the facts which i t involves, i s a very important factor 
i n i n d i v i d u a l morality, and, as w e l l , i n society's moral 
o b l i g a t i o n towards the freedom of the i n d i v i d u a l . The 
whole ethos of a democratic society seems to be contrary to 
any sort of i n d o c t r i n a t i o n and propagandist a r t . I n most 
circumstances, including a r t , we would now be inclin e d to 
agree w i t h Zola t h a t : 
" I t i s not possible to be moral outside the t r u t h " 
(1) 
But a more subtle way of j u s t i f y i n g the u n r e a l i s t i c i n a r t , 
i s to consider a r t , not so much as propaganda, i n the above 
sense, but as part of an ideology, something which shows us 
the sort of existence to which we ought to aspire, which 
f i l l s our imaginations w i t h elevating thoughts of the 
(1) '-Naturalism i n the Theatre.' DMLR. p.209-
(91) 
Be a u t i f u l and the Good. Again, there i s a l o t to be said 
f o r t h i s sort of outlook. We do attach a great deal of 
importance to the appreciation of goodness and beauty: 
and what better way to c u l t i v a t e such appreciation, i t may 
be argued, than through the arts? 
But there i s , nevertheless, a danger - and we do incline 
to regard i t as a danger - that i n our preoccupations with 
our Elevated Thoughts we might tend to lose touch with the 
r e a l business of l i v i n g , and forget about the actual l i m i t -
ations of the world. Yet i t i s only i n r e l a t i o n to the 
r e a l world that any value and significance can be attached 
to. ideals. I t does seem to be important, then, f o r a r t to 
assert, at l e a s t sometimes, i t s commitment to the r e a l , as 
opposed to the i d e a l , world; and t h i s i s what the r e a l i s t 
seems to be t r y i n g to do. As Chernishevsky says: 
"Reality i s greater than,dreams, and essential 
significance more important than fantastic-
pretensions." (1) 
Also relevant here i s Arthur McDowall's assertion of the 
l o g i c a l p r i o r i t y of the r e a l : 
"For l i f e has, as Amiel said, the incomparable 
advantage of being there to s t a r t with. I t 
presents i t s e l f independently of our ideas 
about i t , and with i t our action and 
r e f l e c t i o n must square." (2.) 
The connotations which the words " r e a l i s t i c " and 
" i d e a l i s t i c " have come to acquire w i t h regard to 
a t t i t u d e s apart from the context of aesthetics, helps to 
indicate the d i f f e r e n t , way i n which we f e e l towards each 
(1) L i f e and Aesthetics. DLILR. p,77. 
(2) Realism: a Study i n Art and Thought. p,4. 
(92) 
of them. " R e a l i s t i c " has associations almost e n t i r e l y 
of praise; but " i d e a l i s t i c " , although by no means 
derogatory, suggests that such an a t t i t u d e i s not altogether 
s a t i s f a c t o r y , and that i t s owner s t i l l has a l o t to learn 
about what i t i s possible to accomplish i n the real world. 
I t i s very imusual to f i n d any sort of discussion of 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between r e a l i s t i c a ttitudes and morality. 
Usually, the r e l a t i o n s h i p tends to be assumed, one way or 
the other, without question. One place where the problem 
i s treated i s i n Flugel's Man, Morals and Society. From 
a.\ psychological point of view, Flugel discusses the comp-
ara t i v e merits of r e a l i s t i c and u n r e a l i s t i c (or ' a u t i s t i c ' ) 
t h i n k i n g . Although he admits that ''unrealism' may some-
times have i t s practical., and therefore moral, advantages, 
( f o r instance, unfoimded confidence can be a major factor 
i n the success of a project, or recovery from i l l n e s s , ) 
he s t i l l emphasizes i t s dangers: 
"Of the disadvantages of a u t i s t i c t hinking, 
and the d i s a b i l i t i e s i t imposes on our attempts 
to deal w i t h ' r e a l ' problems, there can 
unfortunately be no doubU." ( l ) 
Whether or not we ought to attach more importance to the 
r e a l or to the ideal i s the kind of value-judgement which 
i t i s notoriously d i f f i c u l t , and probably impossible, to 
prove by l o g i c and reason. But the emphasis upon the 
r e a l , upon which the r e a l i s t seems to be bu i l d i n g his case, 
would seem to be very much more i n harmony w i t h the present 
climate of thought than either the i d e a l i s t or the prop-
agandist view of art.. 
(1) Man, Morals and Society, p. 238. 
(93) 
V, The V a l i d i t y and Importance of the Moral ArgiMent. 
The moral argument implies that there can be a need 
f o r realism i n a r t . I n pieces of straightforward narrative, 
realism i s sometimes required instead of p o t e n t i a l l y 
misleading d i s t o r t i o n s . And the r e a l i s t i c work of art i s 
often needed as a corrective to those misrepresentations 
which have already become embedded i n the a r t i s t i c conven-
tions of the day. 
As long as t h i s argument i s kept w i t h i n i t s context, 
and w i t h i n i t s l i m i t a t i o n s , i t has a l o t of force. I t 
would be ludicrous to t r y to object to every piece of 
unrealisra as immoral. But i t i s not at a l l ludicrous, nor 
i s i t p a r t i c u l a r l y unusual, to object to certain kinds of 
unrealism, such as sentimentality and escapism, on the sort 
of grounds which the r e a l i s t puts forv^ard. Although his 
argument i s not, and probably never could be, watertight, 
i t draws a t t e n t i o n to a danger which many people seem to 
have f e l t to be inherent i n a r t , and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
popular a r t , which has a wide and immediate appeal. 
But how i s t h i s sort of argument related to the 
aesthetic arguments which we examined earlier? I f we 
s t a r t by asking what a r t i s , we f i n i s h up with the 
conclusion that whatever i t i s , i t i s n ' t realism. But i f 
we approach the whole question from another angle, and ask 
what sort of effects c e r t a i n kinds of i?epresentational a r t 
might have on people, i t i s quite possible to reach the 
conclusion that realism might we l l be very important, even 
necessary, to a r t . There .are other reasons, as we saw 
e a r l i e r , which might be put forward to suggest the value 
of realism i n a r t ; the opportunity i t affords f o r the 
(94) 
display of technical s k i l l ; or i t s cognitive function. 
None of these reasons has anything to do with the original 
argument that realism i s not a r t , and the grounds on v/hich 
they are based are so different, that i t i s very d i f f i c u l t 
to see just how they are related, and what t h e i r r e l a t i v e 
importance i s . 
I have already suggested what I think to be the 
correct solution: that we ought to distinguish between 
two senses of " a r t " and recognize that the defining 
c r i t e r i o n of a work of art i s not necessarily the only 
relevant c r i t e r i o n i n assessing i t s value. This question 
of the relationship between purely "aesthetic" and other 
c r i t e r i a i s a controversial one, but i t i s very important 
to the problem of realism i n the a r t s , since any value 
which realism might be said to have, i s a value which i s 
not dependent on purely aesthetic considerations. 
(95) 
Chapter 5; Aesthetic and Non-Aesthetic C r i t e r i a . 
The prohlem which has thus a r i s e n i s how much 
importance we ought to attach to considerations purely of 
a r t , and how much to other considerations, such as those 
of morality, i n the assessment of a par t i c u l a r work of 
a r t , or of works of art i n general. The assumption that 
realism i s a harmful or irrelevant c h a r a c t e r i s t i c only 
seems tenable as long as we adopt the position that only 
purely aesthetic c r i t e r i a are relevant. R e a l i s t s 
themselves, on the other hand, tend to be preoccupied with 
c r i t e r i a of very different kinds: technical, cognitive, 
and moral. 
The d i s t i n c t i o n between the aesthetic, and, say, the 
moral, i s not always an easy one to draw. I t i s cl e a r -
cut when what i s understood by "aesthetic" i s the purely 
formal quality of the work; but i n the c r i t i c i s m of Tolstoy, 
for example, where the d e f i n i t i o n of art i s conceived very 
l a r g e l y i n moral terms, i t becomes much more d i f f i c u l t to 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e between the two. 
The best way of doing so seems to be by seeing on 
what sort of considerations the c r i t e r i a are ultimately 
based. Tolstoy's, for instance, although they have a 
decidedly moral flavour,are based on a concern with what 
i s , or i s not, a r t , as the t i t l e of h i s essay 'What i s Art* 
indi c a t e s . Other c r i t e r i a , such as those invoked by the 
moral argument, are conceived independently of definitions 
of a r t , and do not seem to be at a l l concerned with them. 
I t i s here that the problem a r i s e s . For the arguments 
against realism are based, as we have seen, on consider-
ations deduced from some suggested d e f i n i t i o n of ar t ; 
(96.) 
that i s , upon aesthetic considerations. The defences of 
realism, and most notably the moral defence, a r i s e out of 
problems which have l i t t l e or nothing to do with the 
question of what art i s . And the d i f f i c u l t y i s to discover 
what sort of significance we should attribute to c r i t e r i a 
such as those which are not based on aesthetic p r i n c i p l e s . 
I . The Autonomy of Art. 
This brings us up against the rather ambiguous notion 
of the "autonomy of a r t . " This i s a phrase which seems to 
cover a number of different positions which i t i s possible 
to hold with regard to the r e l a t i v e importance of aesthetic 
and other c r i t e r i a : and i t i s d i f f i c u l t to decide what the 
c e n t r a l p r i n c i p l e i s . What does seem to be very near the 
centre of the doctrine, however, i s the idea that the way 
i n which we evaluate a work of art must be car e f u l l y 
distinguished from the way i n which we evaluate other things 
i n the world and from the way i n which we would respond to the 
same thing i n r e a l l i f e . There are some considerations v^hich 
would quite legitimately influence our reaction i n r e a l l i f e , 
and to other kinds of things, which i t would be irrelevant 
and inappropriate to bring into our assessment of the work of 
a r t . V7e must judge art i n accordance with c r i t e r i a which 
are appropriate to a r t , and these are very often different 
from the kind of p r a c t i c a l and moral c r i t e r i a which we app^y 
i n our ordinary l i f e . One of the c l a s s i c statements of the 
autonomist position comes from A.G. Bradley, i n his lecture 
on"Poetry for Poetry's Sake: 
"What, then, does the formula 'poetry for 
poetry's sake' t e l l us about t h i s experience? 
(97) 
I t says, as I understand i t , these things. 
F i r s t , t h i s experience i s an end i n i t s e l f , 
i s worth having on i t s own account, has an 
i n t r i n s i c value. Next, i t s poetic value i s 
t h i s i n t r i n s i c worth alone. Poetry may also 
have an u l t e r i o r value as a means to culture 
or r e l i g i o n ; because i t conveys instruction, 
or softens the passions, or furthers a good 
cause; because i t brings the poet fame or 
money or a quiet conscience. So much the 
better: l e t i t be valued for these reasons 
too. But i t s u l t e r i o r worth neither i s nor 
can. d i r e c t l y determine i t s poetic worth as a 
s a t i s f y i n g imaginative experience: and t h i s 
i s to be judged e n t i r e l y from within. And 
to^ these two positions, the formula would add, 
though not of necessity, a t h i r d . The con-
sideration of u l t e r i o r ends, whether by the 
poet i n the act of composing, or by the reader 
i n the act of experiencing, tends to lower 
poetic value. I t does so because i t tends to 
change the nature of poetry by taking i t out of 
i t s own atmosphere. For i t s nature i s to be 
not a part, nor yet a copy, of the r e a l world 
(as we commonly \mderstand that phrase) but to 
be a world by i t s e l f , independent, complete, 
autonomous: and to possess i t f u l l y you must 
enter that world, conform to i t s laws, and 
ignore for the time the b e l i e f s , aims and 
p a r t i c u l a r conditions which belong to you i n 
the other world of r e a l i t y . " ( l ) 
(1.)'Poetry for Poetry's Sake. Oxford Lectures on Poetry p. /^  
(98) 
There i s , I think, a r e a l need to assert the autonomy 
of a r t ; for i t i s not uncommon for art to be subjected to a 
kind of criticism- which i s quite inappropriate and which 
implies a lack of appreciation of, and a f a i l u r e to under-
stand the work of a r t . I t i s a l l too easy to apply to 
ar t c r i t e r i a which are irr e l e v a n t or inappropriate, and 
there i s a danger that the application of such c r i t e r i a 
obscures the r e a l meaning and the genuine, merits of the 
work of a r t , and leads us to value or condemn- it^ on the 
wrong grounds. To value Blake's ''Jerusalem', for instance, 
purely or mainly as a p a t r i o t i c hymn-, i s to ignore most of 
the things which are of significance i n the poem, to wrench 
i t out of context: and di s t o r t i t s meaning. Another kind 
of misguided c r i t i c i s m , which i s p a r t i c u l a r l y relevant to. 
the discussion of realism, i s the s i m p l i s t i c raoralism which 
judges a work to be good because i t depicts good people, 
or bad because i t portrays e v i l , and so on, assessing the 
work of art by exactly the same c r i t e r i a as those by which 
one would assess the subject of the representation i n r e a l 
l i f e . This sort of approach ignores the effect of the 
a r t i s t i c context of the representation, and a l l the q u a l i t i e s 
which are a e s t h e t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t ; and i t i s r i g h t l y 
attackBd. The pr i n c i p l e of the autonomy of a r t , then, 
warns us, among other things, against carrying the concerns, 
b e l i e f s , and moral c r i t e r i a of l i f e d i r e c t l y into a r t , and 
evaluating a representation on the basis of our normal 
attitude to what i t represents. Such an argument i s often 
found i n connection with discussions of the disinterestedness 
of the aesthetic response. Olive Bfell says much the same 
thing i n Art, and Charles Lamb objects to an o v e r - l i t e r a l 
response to representation i n hi s essay on Restoration Conedy: 
(99) 
" I d l e gallantry i n a f i c t i o n , a dream, the 
passing pageant of an evening, s t a r t l e s us i n 
the same way as the alarming indications of 
profligacy i n a son or ward i n r e a l l i f e should 
s t a r t l e a parent or guardian." (1) 
This i s only one way i n which c r i t i c i s m of art can be based 
on the wrong sort of considerations, but I have chosen to 
elaborate upon i t here because i t seems, at f i r s t sight, to 
be the kind of mistake which a r e a l i s t might make. In f a c t , 
objections such as Lamb's are r e a l l y directed against a 
naive moralism of which the r e a l i s t cannot properly be 
accused. Indeed the realists,probably more than anyone else, 
have suffered from t h i s kind of c r i t i c i s m . In the nineteenth 
century, t h e i r work was frequently denounced as immoral 
because they depicted immorality, as i n the National 
Vigilance Association's c o l l e c t i o n of documents on 
"Pernicious L i t e r a t u r e " amply shows: 
"There can be no question that Zola i s f i l t h y 
i n the extreme, and obscene to the point of 
b e s t i a l i t y . He i s more unclean, and r e a l i s t i c -
a l l y so, than any other writer, not an 
o r i e n t a l , whose name we can record," (2) 
The r e a l i s t claims that h i s work i s moral; and he can oni^ 
do so because he i s very conscious of the difference whidh 
the a r t i s t i c context makes as regards what i s , and i s not, 
moral. I f he s t i l l claims that truth i s as important i n art 
as i t i s i h r e a l l i f e , i t i s not because he i s not aware of 
the difference, but because, i n t h i s case, he thinks that 
i t does not a f f e c t the i s s u e . 
The demand, which seems to be at the bottom of the 
(1) 'On the A r t i f i c i a l Comedy of the Last Century': Essays 
of E l l a p.193 
(2) toR p.281 
(100) 
autonomist's position, that art should only be judged by 
c r i t e r i a which can appropriately apply to i t , need not, 
n e c e s s a r i l y , be interpreted i n such a way that i t i s h o s t i l e 
to realism: to moral and other non-aesthetic c r i t e r i a . 
As long as such c r i t e r i a are applied i n a way which does 
j u s t i c e to the d i s t i n c t i v e nature of works of art i n general, 
and the p a r t i c u l a r work of a r t i n qestion, there might be no 
need for us to object to them. We could save our objections 
fcr cases, such as the above, where c r i t e r i a are applied i n 
ways which the work of art does not j u s t i f y . A case could, 
and I think ought to b^e made out for distinguishing between 
i r r e l e v a n t or extraneous c r i t e r i a and c r i t e r i a which, a l t h o u ^ 
not a e s t h e t i c , are s t i l l applicable. Religious and p h i l -
osophical c r i t e r i a are relevant to the work of Donne, Herbert, 
or to Paradise Lost., i n a way i n which p a t r i o t i c consider-
ations are not relevant to Jerusalem. I t i s noticeable that 
Bradley, i n h i s discussion of the ' u l t e r i o r worth' of poetry, 
i s lumping together c r i t e r i a of very different kinds, some of 
which are completely extraneous, and others which are just 
non-aesthetic. The difference between valuing a poem as a 
•means to culture or r e l i g i o n , because i t conveys instruction 
or softens the passions', and as something which 'brings the 
poet fame or money or a quiet conscience' seems quite marked. 
But the p r i n c i p l e of the Autonomy of Art i s more 
frequently associated with the much stronger claim, as i s 
suggested by Bradley, that the only c r i t e r i a which are, 
s t r i c t l y speaking, relevant to art are those c r i t e r i a which 
are purely aesthetic - however aesthetic may be defined. 
The supremacy of aesthetic values i s usually modestly limited 
to the sphere of aesthetics i t s e l f , but i t has sometimes been 
extended to include the v;hole of l i f e , as i n Wilde's dialogue. 
(101) 
The C r i t i c as Artist.: 
"Even a colour-sense i s more important, i n the 
development of the individual, than a sense of 
right and wrong." (1) 
( I t might be objected to t h i s that the notion of importance 
i s , i t s e l f , a moral notion: but I am not sure that t h i s i s 
n e c e s s a r i l y so, as w i l l be seen l a t e r . ) 
I t i s more usual, however, to claim, not that aesthetic 
values are all-Important, but that they are the only values 
which are relevant to the c r i t i c i s m of a work of a r t . Thus 
te c h n i c a l s k i l l , when not subordinated to aesthetic consid-
erations, i s a r t i s t i c a l l y worthless. I f the work of a r t 
t e l l s us something about the world as v;ell as being 
beau t i f u l , expressive or what have you, t h i s does not 
matter at a l l . And the p o s s i b i l i t y that i t might have a 
moral value or disvalue i n addition to whatever moral value 
i s i m p l i c i t i n the d e f i n i t i o n of a r t , i s quite without 
s i g n i f i c a n c e . This interpretation of the autonomy of art 
i s c l e a r l y damning to the r e a l i s t , for i t makes realism 
valueless unless i t can be j u s t i f i e d as a r t : and the 
aesthetic arguments have already shown us, quite f o r c e f u l l y , 
that realism i s not a r t . 
I I . The Overridingness of Morality. 
But the r e a l i s t , i f he i s a r e a l i s t on moral grounds, 
can r e t a l i a t e with a p r i n c i p l e of his own: that of the 
overridingness of the demands of morality. I t has been 
claimed that moral pr i n c i p l e s are by t h e i r very nature 
overriding. That means they have greater authority than 
a l l other kinds of p r i n c i p l e s , including aesthetic ones, 
(1) Complete Y/orks of Oscar Wilde, p. 1058. 
(102) 
and no doubt the p r i n c i p l e of the autonomy of a r t . 
Overridingness i s often considered to be a defining 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a moral p r i n c i p l e . Beardsmore, for 
instance, considers moral principles to be l o g i c a l l y superior 
to others, because - so he claims - they are concerned v;ith 
the evaluation of the different ends of hiiman action, rather 
than how those ends are to be achieved. Thus any choice as 
to what ends we are to pursue becomes, by de f i n i t i o n , a 
moral choice. Beardsmore r e j e c t s : 
"the autonomist's claim that v/e may choose 
between the demands of art and those of 
morality. For the question of the r e l a t i v e 
importance of those demands i s one v^hich could 
be rais e d only from within the standpoint of 
morality. And from within that standpoint, 
the question ansv^ers i t s e l f . " (1) 
For Hare, too, moral pri n c i p l e s are those which a man accepts 
as being of ultimate importance i n h i s l i f e ; those to which 
he i s prepared to s a c r i f i c e a l l other p r i n c i p l e s : 
"A man's moral p r i n c i p l e s , i n t h i s sense, are 
those which i n the end, he accepts to guide 
h i s l i f e by, even i f t h i s involves breaches 
of subordinate p r i n c i p l e s , such as those of 
aesthetics or etiquette." (2) 
But there i s a flaw, which has not gone unnoticed, i n 
t h i s claim that moral principles are almost by d e f i n i t i o n 
overriding. Both Hare's and Beardsmore's accounts are 
s a t i s f a c t o r y only as long as we are prepared to define 
moral p r i n c i p l e s by t h e i r status alone; as those principles 
on which we decide between different, possible aims, or 
those by which we ultimately govern our l i v e s . But moral 
(1) Art and Morality. p.30" 
(2) Freedom and Reason, p.169. 
(103) 
p r i n c i p l e s , as so defined, could have any content. I f 
overridingness i s made the c r i t e r i o n of morality, then any 
pr i n c i p l e which i s overriding w i l l on that account be a 
moral p r i n c i p l e . But t h i s i s not exactly what those who 
appeal to the doctrine are tr y i n g to show. They are 
attempting to e s t a b l i s h the authority of a c e r t a i n kind.-of 
p r i n c i p l e . "Moral" has descriptive meaning as well as 
h i e r a r c h i c a l status. When a moral pr i n c i p l e i s considered, 
as i t usually i s , as one with a c e r t a i n type of content, 
then there does not appear to be any l o g i c a l necessity for 
i t to occupy an overriding position among pr i n c i p l e s . As 
O.K.Grant says: 
"Why might not a man sometimes or always refuse 
to act i n accordance with c e r t a i n moral rules 
e n t i r e l y on the ground that i n the situations 
i n which he sometimes or always finds himself, 
other non-moral p r i n c i p l e s , that he sincerely 
believes to be of greater importance, are 
relevant? " ( l ) 
I I I . The Importance of Noni-^Aesthetic C r i t e r i a . 
Thus an appeal to the overridingness of morality, 
however plausible i t might seem, i s not, i n i t s e l f , an 
adequate defence of realism against the attack of the 
autonomist. There are serious flaws i n the whole doctrine 
of overridingness. We may f e e l that moral principles ought 
to be overriding, but t h i s i s a moral, rather than a l o g i c a l , 
p r i n c i p l e , and cannot therefore answer the autonomist. 
(1) "Akrasia and the C r i t e r i a of Assent to P r a c t i c a l P r i n c i p l e s " 
Mind. July, 1956. 
(104) 
Nor does the doctrine help to re-instate other c r i t e r i a which 
are not moral, such as the technical and cognitive c r i t e r i a 
which, as we have seen, are also relevant to realism. 
A more s a t i s f a c t o r y way of defending realism i s to point 
out the weaknesses of the autonomist position. There i s 
nothing wrong with the claim that a work of art should be 
judged only by c r i t e r i a which are relevant and conducive to 
a f u l l understanding of i t . But the attempt to l i m i t such 
considerations to purely aesthetic ones seems to me to be 
taking the demand to an unnecessary extreme, and even to be 
c o n f l i c t i n g with the need for a complete appreciation of the 
work of a r t . 
Other c r i t e r i a are not, a p r i o r i , irrelevant to the 
assessment of a r t . I think that i t i s a mistake to claim 
that the defining c r i t e r i o n alone i s the relevant standard of 
judgement. In other cases we v/ould hardly ever think of 
l i m i t i n g the c r i t e r i a of value to the c r i t e r i a which 
dist i n g u i s h , and even which j u s t i f y , something. A good man, 
a good dog, a good school, a good table, a l l of these would be 
assessed by other c r i t e r i a as well as those which define them: 
and i n order to come to a complete and adequate decision about 
them, i t i s considered necessary to look at them from as 
many, not as few, angles as possible. Someone whose defin-
i t i o n of a good school, for instance, was based only on 
s t r i c t l y academic c r i t e r i a , would be thought to have a narrow 
and misguided approach. And the same can, I think, be said 
of someone who t r i e s to evaluate art on s t r i c t l y aesthetic 
c r i t e r i a alone. I t i s true that a r t i s perhaps p a r t i c u l a r l y 
vulnerable to inappropriate c r i t i c i s m , and attempts must be 
made to guard against t h i s . But to look at art sol e l y from 
the " a e s t h e t i c " point of view i s to ignore aspects of the work 
(105) 
which are frequently of great importance, both to the a r t i s t 
himself, and to the reader or viewer whose appreciation has 
not been corrupted by exaggerated notions of a r t i s t i c 
autonomy. Autonomy, i n t h i s sense, i s an obstacle to that 
complete and appropriate response to the work of art v/hich 
the very same pr i n c i p l e of autonom.y was o r i g i n a l l y meant to 
ensure. 
We have, then, every right to apply c r i t e r i a of 
morality, s k i l l , and whatever else i s relevant to any 
p a r t i c u l a r work of a r t . Morality, i n p a r t i c u l a r , i s a 
c r i t e r i o n which would be almost always applicable. And 
the f a c t that realism i s j u s t i f i e d by moral, technical, and 
not aes t h e t i c , considerations i n no way means that i t i s of 
no value to the work of a r t . There would be a case for 
saying that the completely r e a l i s t i c work, with no hint of 
an "a e s t h e t i c " quality, was not art at a l l . I f something 
lacks the defining c r i t e r i o n of a r t , v/hatever that may be, 
i t w i l l be true that i t i s not a r t , and t h i s i s what we f e e l 
about Madame Tussaud's waxworks, and some examples of 
i l l u s i o n i s t a r t . In the same way, a school i n which there 
was no sign of any academic t r a i n i n g would hardly qualify 
to be c a l l e d a school. But when realism i s found, as i t 
often i s , i n conjunction with "aesthetic" q u a l i t i e s , i t i s 
a mistake to say that i t i s the "aesthetic" q u a l i t i e s alone 
which give the work i t s value. Realism, too, can be an 
important ingredient of a r t , i n a general sense. 
(106) 
Conclusion. 
I have been concerned, not so much with building up a 
watertight case on behalf of realism, (although I have t r i e d 
to suggest some of the reasons for which we can, and do, 
value i t ) , as with showing that the case against realism, 
as we frequently see i t today, i s very much over-stated. 
The reasons upon which we are asked to base our contempt for 
realism do not provide adequate grounds for t h i s contempt: 
and realism - realism i n i t s simplest and most l i t e r a l sense, 
without sophisticated re - d e f i n i t i o n s and re-formulations -
has not been proved to be impossible, i l l e g i t i m a t e or 
i r r e l e v a n t i n a r t . 
I n order to defend realism i t i s not necessary to deny 
the claim that realism i s not a r t . This seems to be a 
p e r f e c t l y v a l i d claim, when i t i s understood as meaning that 
realism i s not the quality which distinguishes something as 
being a work of a r t , and provides a j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the 
existence of works of art i n general. I f art i s capable 
of being defined at a l l , i t w i l l c e r t a i n l y be defined as 
something other than a copy of the world. We do well to 
remind ourselves of the d i s t i n c t i o n between realism and 
a r t , i f only to avoid making the mistake of assessing a l l 
works of a r t s o l e l y by r e a l i s t i c c r i t e r i a , and ignoring 
those c r i t e r i a , frequently more important, which give the 
work i t s aesthetic s i g n i f i c a n c e . 
But the mistake which the opponents of realism make i s 
i n thinking that, because realism i s not art i n t h i s sense, 
we are j u s t i f i e d i n ignoring i t , perhaps even c r i t i c i s i n g i t , 
when we come across i t i n a work of a r t . This l i n e of 
approach i s supported by the unwarranted assumption that 
(107') 
the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of realism must be i n terms of an argument 
which can show that realism i s art or that a r t i s realism. 
Thus a great deal of time and energy i s spent upon 
d i s c r e d i t i n g the mimetic theory of a r t , a theory which has 
perhaps never been held i n the form i n which i t i s attacked, 
and i s c e r t a i n l y not the only, and probably not even a very 
important, defence of realism. Here again, those who attack 
realism, although they do not prove t h e i r point, do help to 
c l a r i f y our thinking about art a great deal. By c l e a r l y 
distinguishing between art and imitation, they have no doubt 
helped to reduce the amoimt of time which i s wasted i n 
attempts to modify and reformulate the mimetic theory i n 
order to make i t a consistent and acceptable theory of a r t . 
I t i s as well to have the flaws i n the mimetic theory well 
and t r u l y exposed, so that, i f we want to, we can concentrate 
on the r e a l business of deciding v;hat i t i s that makes 
something a work of a r t , without f e e l i n g obliged to make i t 
compatible with an imitation theory. But the exposure of 
the mimetic theory only prevents us from valuing realism 
for the wrong reasons. I t does not, in. i t s e l f , prove to us 
that realism i s either harmful or i r r e l e v a n t . 
For our reasons for respecting realism are not gro;inded 
on considerations of v^hat i s , or i s not, a r t ; but they are 
the r e s u l t of a very different approach to the v/hole subject. 
The c r i t e r i a by which realism i s seen to be valuable are not 
d i s t i n c t i v e l y aesthetic ones, but those technical, cognitive, 
and moral c r i t e r i a which we apply i n many different 
circumstances. And the value of realism according to these 
c r i t e r i a i s emphasized and supplemented by contrast v^ith the 
e x i s t i n g t r a d i t i o n of representational a r t , to which realism. 
(108) 
i s a reaction, and a corrective. To depict r e a l i s t i c a l l y 
what before has been depicted conventionally, or not depicted 
at a l l , demands observation and s k i l l ; smd can have a 
revelatory effect which i s of both cognitive and moral value. 
None of these aspects of realism i s s u f f i c i e n t l y emphasized 
by a discussion of realism apart from the representational 
t r a d i t i o n i n which i t a r i s e s ; and yet the aesthetic arguments 
against i t are almost always developed without reference to 
t h i s t r a d i t i o n . When realism i s considered i n i t s r i g h t f u l 
context, however, vve can much more e a s i l y become convinced 
that there are very good reasons for not ignoring i t . 
The moral defence of realism i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important 
because i t r a i s e s , i n i t s most acute form, the question of 
how much authority we ought to attribute to the arguments 
i n favour of realism i n a r t . We might be quite w i l l i n g to 
allow that t e c h n i c a l , and perhaps even cognitive consider-
ations should, i n a r t i s t i c circumstances, give way to 
aesthetic ones: and we might be prepared to admit that i f 
realism i s not a r t , then, v/hatever i t s value i n other respects, 
i t s value i n a work of art i s negative. But i f we value 
something on moral grounds, we are much l e s s happy about 
subordinating or s a c r i f i c i n g i t to other considerations, 
unless we have a very good reason for so doing. And thus 
we reach an apparent stalemate, with the argument on the one 
side that realism i s not a r t ; and on the other, the argiiment 
that a r t must t e l l the truth. Each position i s based on 
very differ e n t kinds of considerations: and the advocates 
on e i t h e r side claim that t h e i r considerations are the most 
important. Opponents of realism appeal to the principle of 
the Autonomy of Art: whilst those who defend i t imply, i f 
(109) 
they do not a c t u a l l y say i t , that moral demands override even 
aesthetic ones. 
The arguments on both sides are convincing, and the 
c o n f l i c t between them, i s not best to be solved by denying 
ei t h e r of them: but by c l a r i f y i n g the relations between 
them i n order to^ show that they do not have to c o n f l i c t at 
a l l . I t i s here that i t . . i s necessary to draw some sort of 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the two meanings of " a r t " : art as the 
defining c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a v?ork of art; and art as an 
i n s t i t u t i o n : as the whole c l a s s of works of a r t , considered 
from a l l relevant angles. And i t i s here, I think, that 
the arguments against realism overreach themselves, either 
because they f a i l to draw the d i s t i n c t i o n , or because they 
ass-ume that the p r i n c i p l e of the autonomy of art implies 
that the defining c r i t e r i o n of art i s the only one which 
can properly be used to assess the value of a work of a r t . 
But i f we recognize that the idea of the autonomy of art i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y an attempt to guard against irrelevant and 
inappropriate c r i t i c i s m , and to ensure an adequate under-
standing of the work of a r t , then we can see that i t i s not 
necessary, and that i t i s even mistaken, to interpret i t so 
that a l l non-aesthetic c r i t e r i a are, for that reason, held 
to be inappropriate. To f a i l to appreciate those aspects 
of a work of a r t which are not, s t r i c t l y speaking, aesthetic, 
i s to look at a r t from a point of view so p u r i f i e d that not 
only what i s i r r e l e v a n t , but also much that i s s i g n i f i c a n t , 
has been excludedl. 
I t i s i n t h i s way that the apparent c o n f l i c t between 
our opinions about realism can best be resolved. We can, 
and should, accept that realism i s not a r t , i n the one sense, 
without being committed to denying that i t i s of no value to 
(110.) 
ar t i n the other. Thus those who claim, or simply imply, 
that the r e j e c t i o n of the mimetic theory of a r t necessitates 
the r e j e c t i o n of realism i t s e l f , seem to be making an 
unv/arranted leap between d i f f e r e n t kinds of argument. 
The case against realism i s by no means as conclusive as i t 
i s sometimes made out to be. In fa c t i t i s very 
unsatisfactory. 
The implications of a l l t h i s extend f a r beyond the 
problem, of realism i t s e l f . The controversy over realism 
only serves to bring to a head issues of a wider nature, 
concerning the kind of ways i n which we can and should 
respond to a v^ork of a r t . And t h i s v/ould s t i l l be 
important, even i f the p a r t i c u l a r arguments about realism 
which we have been discussing, were shown to be unfounded. 
The lesson which v^ e should learn, I think, from t h i s whole 
question i s that we ought to have an a t t i t u d e to works of 
a r t which i s broad and f l e x i b l e enough to admit the value 
of non-aesthetic considerations i n a r t . To t r y to confine 
a r t , and the correct response to a r t , w i t h i n the l i m i t s of 
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